



A CANDID CATECHISM FOR THE COMPETENT

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(I)

TEACHING COMPETITION

Some people arguing for competition seem to think this entails advocating capitalism and that the only thing which can compete with capitalism is socialism, but they seem glad indeed that socialism can't compete at all well with capitalism. That gives them away: what they really want is capitalism, not competition for the sake of competition but only the kind of competition which can occur within, or under, capitalism. If they liked competition for the sake of competition, they would relish seeing something else compete really well with capitalism and they

would tend to emphasize rather than deprecate the merits of the other competitor or competitors. And there are such, when we know where to look.

Capitalism by verbal definition is simply the use of wealth to get more wealth: capital is wealth used thus. So far as capitalism is at all theoretical – that is, so far as it has anything to *say*, apart from its being only a practice – it can tell us only that the purpose of having wealth is to use it to get more wealth. It says nothing more at all about wealth. But there are other things that may be said about wealth and its purposes. One of these is that the purpose of having wealth is simply to enjoy the wealth one has, either because one has enough or because one does not want to risk losing the enjoyment of what one has, despite its not being quite enough, or even not nearly enough, in order to try to get enough. Some say the purpose of wealth is to allow for increasingly refined delight in beauty itself, as manifest in subtly executed paintings and statues and music. These mostly appeal more to the mind than, unless the mind is disordered, to bodily or emotional appetites. So there are at least two views of wealth which can compete in intelligent argument with what capitalism, as understood simply, has to say about wealth; even if the purpose of wealth were to enjoy only wealth itself, the time and effort spent in getting more, if one had enough to enjoy rightly, would be time

and effort wasted which ought to have been applied to enjoying what one had. And if one had enough wealth to enjoy thoroughly things of the mind which were superior to matter, it would really be wasteful to use in gaining more wealth strictly material the energy and time one ought to spend in contemplating these or growing in knowledge of them. That would be even more deplorably wasteful if attending to things of the mind can assure us that putting economic production in a certain perspective will enable us to live as we ought. However, some capitalists seem fixedly to feel, far more than capitalism itself need be deemed to imply, that although the satisfactions derived from wealth might indeed be limited or fleeting, yet the fastish fun of competing for that wealth and its satisfactions, and of competing to invent and sell novelties, must feed on itself forever and forever swell itself. As if the purpose of any emotion were only our feeling it.

Those capitalists are quite content, even anxious, to pay taxes for the state to mandate and even help maintain a comfortable minimum “standard of living” for all those ordinary men who ordinarily fall short in capitalist competition. These latter fall short therein chiefly because ordinary men cannot see, since we are not half-blind, that the prizes in that contest are worth risking even a failure to get them, not to mention losing far better chances in the process: chances so good,

like the chance of winning a woman's love, that we ought to deem it better not to succeed at them after trying our hardest than not attempt them at all, which presumably is how devout capitalists think of what they work at, poor souls. If the temper of ordinary men were not dulled by their being given that comfortable minimum standard of living despite capitalist sharp practice, they might quickly outlaw the latter. Although we must always risk failing wretchedly to reach those goals which are really worthy, in order to have any chance at all of attaining them, yet if everyone assumed that risk it would afford an almost safe assurance that some at least would attain them – and it is more important that they be attained than that all of us attain them. For it is not true that, so long as we avoid doing what is evidently wrong, all good things are equally worth seeking; there are some goods which require – in two senses – a spiritual mind to see them: they can be seen only by an intellect and no intellect is complete which doesn't see them; a mind which neglects such reasons for acting, which properly are called "reasons," in favour of lesser motives, which indeed are merely "motives," is not working as a mind ought, even when the lesser motives prompt exactly the same deeds objectively right. (On the other hand, of course, it would be wrong to refrain, just because our own feelings about it were not sufficiently pure and exalted, from

doing what by any objective standard really ought to be done, as we can observe some women, especially, tend to refrain.) There will be considerable discussion in the essays ahead, of the kind of reasons mentioned here.

Preventing people from acting for such reasons, or keeping them in ignorance of these, is a worse wrong than robbing them of what they paid for or withholding from them what they and their employer agreed their work is worth, though criminal fraud and robbery with violence seem to be the only kind of injustice of which capitalists commonly conceive when they consider justice. (Devout capitalists seem to take morality for granted, as men who have to work at being moral never can, and to take it for granted also that morality presupposes capitalism.) These “reasons” include the very reason for the right to property in the first place. Capitalists cherish the property more than the reason for it.

St. Augustine, I believe, said heresy is the worst sin, or something like that, because it prompts the commission of sins. One heresy to which capitalism gives rise, if it does not necessarily imply that heresy, is the view that possession of at least some wealth is necessary to the attainment of, and even to our validly pursuing, human perfection: having wealth is the beginning of morality – which therefore has more to do with how we use money than with the way we got it. The

heresy denies, as Mortimer Adler seemingly denies, that the will to do what is right, or, perhaps, at a bare minimum, the will to avoid wrong (perhaps at high cost) is sufficient for “a good life”: it seems to deny that men who serve justice in forgoing “essential goods” unavailable except through injustice can be truly “fulfilled,” at least in this life. It forgets that our having such an experience, if we don’t actually give up on wanting what we ought to have, can intensify in us the joy of battle and offer us the “jolly time” which G.K. Chesterton suggested can compensate much for our not being “happy.” The heresy prompts some to feel, perhaps, that studying or teaching “the humanities” is an enjoyable outcome of having wealth or a pleasant way of achieving it rather than a guide to producing it properly. That others are incidentally or even consequently much demeaned while the “intelligent” seek “higher education” seems either not to occur or not to matter much to people devoted to “learning.” Or they might feel that any aspiring to higher callings must prove themselves by persevering, without becoming demoralized, in the service of the lesser master Mammon. They may feel that service to a capitalist employer is an “evolutionary hurdle” men must overcome to be worthy of having (few but brilliant) children and a “normal” domestic life.

If, as the chief apostles of Capitalism preach, getting money were the quickest, most convenient way to achieve freedom, including the freedom to be normally domestic, then competition for money would be competition for freedom and those who had most money would have most freedom; they would gain even the freedom to purchase for themselves from our own fellows what we ourselves need to exercise our own freedom, since someone with vastly more money than anyone needs can at whim inflate enormously the “cost” of anything we need, by offering his own outrageous price to sellers dependent on getting money. That is clear enough from all men’s having perfectly equal rights to win the lottery. This kind of “ideal freedom” is the sort of prize for which capitalism’s theorists encourage us all to compete but which few (under capitalism) can attain. But if the many did not seek that kind of prize or did not serve more or less blindly the seeking of such prizes, that kind of prize would hardly be available at all to the sort of man who wants it most and who employs it worst. Our having freedom really depends therefore upon our not depending upon money for it. Men ought to compete not for freedom but in using well the freedom we ought to uphold together for one another.

When capitalists suggest things should belong to those who most effectively compete for them, they mean we ought to compete, for anything we want or need, under the conditions which capitalists favour and which favour capitalism. They mean that people who can produce real goods must compete to sell their abilities to people with extra (or most of the) money instead of requiring that people with extra money compete to lend it to those who actually work. They don't mean that everyone who wants ownership of productive property ought to run in a foot race or fight in a boxing tournament and that the winner should be awarded all that property or that it ought to be parceled out to those who came first, second and third and that the rest of us ought to earn our living by working for those successful competitors as they should choose to employ us, or that the right to clothe ourselves must depend on our skill at throwing the javelin or the shot-put. They certainly don't mean that our ranking in agricultural-college exams should set the order in which we were entitled to choose among parcels of land available in sufficient size and number for all or most of the candidates to get a reasonably fruitful one. They mean we ought to compete with them in cozening or constraining the productive to be compliant and in buying and selling what the

productive produce and in investing and attracting investors and especially in promoting the conceit that “That’s living, man.”

At least the sense of achievement afforded by contending in most physical sports entails the will’s withstanding real adversity, which is at any rate a higher exercise than that of capitalist cunning and is not merely a physical sensation like the taste of delicious food or our skin’s contact with the texture of luxurious clothing or the comfort of a sound house in a cold windstorm.

Men properly keen on competition among men would want it to be of a kind especially fitting for men: competition in activities specific to mankind, pursued for genuine “reasons” rather than those mere “motives” which prompt our seeking most of the goals of capitalism.

Men who really relished competition, I suggest, would like even to see competition between kinds of competition, if that were feasible. They would like to see highly intelligent athletes physically superb both compete at both chess and the hundred yards dash and compose poetry celebrating the comparative merits and opposing qualities of the two pastimes. They would like to see capitalism, which essentially is “value-free”, called to prove its consonance with as many

“value-systems” as men can think of, showing with which of these it was most consistent.

If capitalists really wanted Capitalism to compete with the way of life depending on widespread ownership of productive property which G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc called Distributism, which is more closely justified in the following essays, and if they really thought that Distributism is less efficient than Capitalism at producing enough of what men need, you’d think those capitalists would make their competing at wealth-production keener for themselves by accepting handicaps as they do in golf, where competition really appeals to them.

Men who really relished competition would like to see it active in all sorts of manifestations: They would not object to seeing ordinary men compete in teaching one another how to do for ourselves, in working better at our own practical crafts, those things which we ourselves need done, with each learner eager to build on the lore he received and teach back even more. For the two general categories in which we ought chiefly to compete are doing things for ourselves and helping others to do things for themselves. The latter, under normal conditions – conditions in which humans ought to live – is ordinarily as

reasonably profitable economically as any ancillary activity has any right to be – and almost all occupations under capitalist conditions are increasingly ancillary. Or men might compete similarly in teaching one another how to raise their children to follow Reason with minimal stress to a child's individual constitution, or even how to help a wife enjoy more fully her being physically female and personally feminine. Men who really wanted competition and not merely capitalism would always seek to be thus truly inventive in unveiling the good, far more than mere commercial engineering ever could be in devising goods.

If the belief that wealth is meant to be enjoyed, and the belief that wealth should be used to enjoy things which are better than wealth, are to compete fairly with the attitude of capitalism – which seems to feel men ought most to enjoy competing for wealth – then all the merits of all those positions ought to be fairly set before their judges, and weighed by the highest standards of right reason, before those judges have actually adopted one of them. That is one of the chief purposes of early education properly understood, which ought to begin only when its disciples are able to understand at least remotely why they are being thus educated. For children raised by devoted adherents of one of those positions are

apt to adopt it without much questioning or indeed much inquisitiveness about it. That is how the capitalist assumption prevails today.

One of the modern schoolteachers' primary assumptions is that we can get most of what we want only by working for money from someone else (as teachers supposedly teaching free enterprise now work for the government instead of being self-employed); this is the capitalist assumption that real freedom of choice is conditional upon possession of money, the easiest route to possession of many other things. That is begging the question whether all those many other things are really desirable or whether we are conditioned to feel that they are or that we make them desirable by our choosing them. But making a lot of things easy to have weakens our power of deciding which of them would be really worth our striving for them; having money to buy anything we like is not an accurate measure of how much we want it; readiness to work hard for one thing specifically, and especially to work hard at making it, is an excellent yardstick of desire. An even better one would be our enjoying hard work at making what we want.

Using money as the "ordinary" means of acquisition also tends to foster neglect of those things which money cannot buy – capitalism does say that what

wealth is used for is to gain more wealth: “all things viably good are buyably so” – and which are essential to human life well lived, like the bringing up of one’s own children, or else it tends to foster attempts to achieve such things by hire or purchase, perhaps at many a remove, as when we pay governments to pay to have our children taught what “society” – which may not be our own society but only feign being ours – wants them taught.

Our wills are also weakened by the imposition of others’ wills upon them – especially, perhaps, when the others impose their wills because they are hired for that. A child upon whose mind almost the whole personal direction of his teachers more or less unconsciously impresses the necessity of his doing for other people things they want which he finds irksome, in order to do what he himself wants, is likely to conclude, maybe more or less unconsciously, especially if he is intelligent, imaginative, and also indolent, that the secret of a peaceful life is simply to want what one wants, only enough to enjoy daydreaming that he has it or is doing it. This is the more likely if he has learned to read admiringly about heroes who resisted tyranny but the entire atmosphere of his society which he absorbs unconsciously is acceptance of commercial domination. If that attitude grows in him, and he comes to rely on it in adolescence and if when adult he finds

a “job” under capitalism that flatters his vanity by serving a “noble” social purpose through a considerable outlay of mental energy without real intellectual effort, his mind may well be broken when he comes at last genuinely to desire in full actuality the person and personality of a female who clearly loves him and to marry whom he now is willing, or so he deems, to accept the servitude described in George Orwell’s book *Keep the Aspidistra Flying*. (Such a consequence of giving rein to real concupiscence may well confirm him then in his earlier attenuation of attitude. Others with stronger emotional appetites and less inclined to live a life of the intellect may enjoy far “better” mental “health” than he for far longer.) Being an ordinary man denied an ordinary life by capitalism is morally far more calamitous than being a director forbidden to direct plays under Communism, like the suicide in the film *The Lives of Others*. What education ought to do, therefore, is teach not how to do or get what you’d like but rather that there are some deeds which all men should strive their uttermost to do, whether or not these seem practically possible for some particular men and whether or not we are inclined to like doing them, such as having children and teaching them how to serve Justice according to Reason. It ought to teach all available valid reasons – grounds which appeal to the faculty of reason – for striving to do these deeds,

whether those reasons are found in “moralising, which men find the dreariest experience on earth” (said Chesterton) or in “mysticism, in which men are really interested.” But Chesterton seemed to think that attempting to do what is right was far less dreary than teaching or learning it merely by the light of natural reason: “...if you think virtue is languor, just try it and see.” But to try it sincerely, you need to know exactly why you should – and why and how all men, especially husbands and their wives, ought to compete chiefly in giving themselves up not so much to each other as to their illustrating together in matter the elements of Justice. They might indeed “compete” zestfully at doing that.

The glory of “competing at being human” is that in attempting it we need not prevent others from being as human as they could be; Denis Dyer’s being the best fencer in Newfoundland of his time didn’t keep Robert Young from being also as good as he could become: this is the difference between competing to excel and competing to acquire.

(II)

MAKING, GENERATING, AND JUSTICE

Feeling that “sex” is something to be achieved, and feeling generally that life is a process of achieving goals, are attitudes consistent with each other and with much other modern misconduct. The notion that we may seek what we like so long as we don’t break the Commandments or any valid human laws, which has largely replaced the truth that we are obliged to pursue positively certain proper patterns of activity, is the modern major heresy which is either “worse than sin” or is perhaps the worst sin. That is partly because the disaster which made it possible for us to separate sexual pleasure from the spiritual joy of begetting or conceiving, also “permitted” us to separate other enjoyments from the joy we always ought to have in justice. It made us “able” to confuse misfortune with injustice and to regard getting pregnant as even a kind of wrongdoing or, even more frequently, as a misfortune.

Being “able” to confuse misfortune with injustice is what allowed men to view the prospect of destroying mankind through “overpopulation” as inherently “wrong” although those who saw it thus seemed to see nothing essentially immoral or even unfortunate in our being dominated by a lust which appeared to make that destruction likely. But if our surrendering to lust is not voluntary but unavoidable, so as to be not wrong but only unfortunate, then any outcome of that lust which cannot be avoided without our resorting to unjust methods, which some people say contraception and abortion always are, is itself only unfortunate and not wrong, so it would not be wrong to accept our race’s perishing through over-populating. It would be just our bad luck. Otherwise, those who preach against over-population are simply using the prospect of misfortune to encourage us to be immoral in voluntarily giving way to lust and compounding that particular immorality with murder when over-population is countered by abortion. Anyway, the prospect of that misfortune, which we have a duty to endure when the alternative is injustice, is being used to make people equate getting pregnant with doing wrong, although any wrongdoing associated with getting pregnant was done well before the pregnancy itself, so that any disgrace which may be associated with pregnancy consists only in the pregnancy’s being a well-founded

proof that wrongdoing preceded it. Being pregnant is not wrong – it may indeed be a remedy for the wrong preceding it – nor is it ever a misfortune; any misfortune which may be associated with pregnancy is always the result of other circumstances within which the pregnancy occurs. Every pregnancy proffers a new performer for our “dramatization in matter” of the Demands of Justice. For we ought never to be satisfied, until the world ends or while the last fertile man and woman are alive, except in satisfying those specific demands. They are specific: that every person own anything he intentionally causes to be what it is, whether by way of production or maintenance; that no one be judge in his own case; that a servant not be greater than his master (or an agency not supersede whoever authorized it). Our very existence would seem to be due either to these requirements or to a generosity, rather than justice itself, which gave us access to justice. At least that seems to have been generosity when justice is what we want; but our sometimes not wanting justice, as when justice is “allied” with grave misfortune, is reasonably deemed by many to be a result of our nature’s having early become defective.

Our being generated is due to our parents’ reasons or merely to their motives for generating. Possibly our parents insulted our humanity by generating us from

unworthy motives; but that does not mean that noble principles of generation no longer exist; they still exist, and any who learn of them must serve them.

The human race exists as it does, if there is a reason (if our human reason really works), so that what has been due to men will be due to more men: so that more men may “enact (unselfconsciously) the drama of being just.” If justice is our own due, it is not because we originated it. All we can really say about justice, on our own authority, without reference to religion, is that we must either serve it or defy it, applying to our lives or refusing to apply there those simple rules already cited.

Men own what they need by reason of making something which someone needs; those who really need something must produce something really needed, even if they are only to offer it in exchange; a necessity must not be produced in exchange for a luxury; no man ought not to be obliged to produce a luxury in order to earn a living.

The things we make ought to be made by ourselves and with our own living energy, so far as possible, so as to become most fully our own, whether we do that in humble service to Justice chiefly or simply to assert our own mastery of ownership, which would be sheer Pride; it ought to be impossible for others to

judge us in this just by watching what we do: to judge, by any outward sign, whether we are servants of Justice or are slavishly devoted to wholly possessing good things (which are far more important than money, since money properly is used only in exchanging goods), as men now are well able to judge certainly, in most cases, whether, in plain fact, we are employers or employees. Making things with our own directly personal skill and effort and our own living energy is truly efficient making; that is a kind of efficiency which is worth money and is not to be measured chiefly by its costing less money; the kind of efficiency we measure by its costing less money, is most often worth only what we pay for it.

“Cheap” efficiency has allowed relatively few to get enormously rich by supplying much food and clothing cheaply to many, and the availability of that food to the many has enabled them to produce an increasing variety of fuel-powered devices for work and amusement, to sell to one another and to growers and transporters and retailers of food and clothing. This has resulted in reproduction of humans on a scale which perhaps would not have been possible if men had continued to make – in the true sense of the word “make” – for themselves the things they need or to acquire some of the things they needed by offering some things others needed (only those who make what is needed deserve

to have what is needed). The great advantage now of that unprecedented growth in population is that humans are numerous enough at the moment to uphold fairly effectively, against any current standing armies employed by politicians and the politicians' paymasters, our properly recognizing and recovering the high human purpose of applying noble truths to eager activity.

Our having overlooked (or other people's having distracted us from) the strict criteria for our economic activities which are implicit in the principle that things belong to those who make them, has left us "at the mercy of our likes and dislikes." For the necessity of learning the complexities required for an executive career in industry, commerce or investments has never seemed to the ordinary man so binding upon himself as the simple rules of serving justice ought to be when at last we've noticed them. We've always felt more or less that getting that kind of lore could safely be left to men who in Chesterton's words were dull enough to find it interesting. For ourselves, living with a wife, and maybe later a child or two, working at employment that yielded comfort at home even if the work itself were not always comforting in any spiritual sense especially, and sports and poker, seemed to suffice to get us through life. Anyway, the worst of modern employment, especially if it were unionized, could never be as irksome to

us as we always assumed a medieval serf had always found his, could it? For we hadn't realized then that the serf must have deemed himself living under the aegis of abstract justice largely realized in the concrete, since he owned most of what he caused to generate in the ground from which he could not be evicted and on which his "rent" could not be raised; he was content in his own style to "take a few roughs with a smooth."

So we followed our likes where they led, so far as we thought we could go without "breaking the Commandments," and if we did break a few it was partly because we didn't see their firm foundation in such solid wisdom as here comes to light, and where our inclinations finally led seems to have been relatively low when measured against where an accurate love of natural justice could have brought us: at the very highest now, we are mostly the servants of the servants of Wealth, and not so much, even then, of Mammon as of Lucre. ("Mammon" at least is "Solid Stuff.")

We have now perhaps an opportunity to cure the world's "over-population" of non-makers and feigned owners; we might manage that by manfully withstanding lust even if plying at "sex" seems now the only sound and elemental art and craft and hobby readily available for the common man. It has probably seemed to us

that practicing sexual self-restraint just to keep the current system of employment running smoothly was greater effort than the result was worth; we likely felt in our heart of hearts that what Norman Mailer called the sliminess of contraception was more suitable to the way we got our money. But playing an essential part in restoring worth to men, even if men don't all welcome the restoration, might well seem worth the struggle to refrain from jumping on a specific set of bones kept handy mostly to repel our advances.

Besides exercising a spiritually satisfying self-restraint, we might, while trying to restore moral order to our own society, indulge by way of turnabout in a little gratifying "oppression." We could make laws forbidding people to remain after a certain date in the future possessed of money, beyond a certain reasonable amount, which the records showed had been amassed by methods demonstrably unjust and permanently so, such as "ownership" of businesses by mere lenders of money and employers' selling goods they hired others to make.

Hiring production for resale is unjust because things made for sale ought to be sold by their makers: owners alone ought to sell and makers alone ought to be owners. Goods made for hire ought not to be resold for a profit by him who did the hiring, unless he shares the profit with the maker. That is to say, if a cobbler

makes shoes for sale generally, to all and sundry indiscriminately, anyone who buys a pair from him may sell them for what the seller can get; for the cobbler had a fair chance at the same profit. But if I hire a cobbler to make for me particularly a particular pair of shoes in a particular style of a particular leather, for three hundred dollars, and a multimillionaire later is particularly taken with my shoes so that he offers me two thousand dollars for the pair, then I may not sell them to that multimillionaire without giving the cobbler half my profit; the cobbler and I were equal sharers in the making of the shoes, since I supplied the motive and he the means, and so the cobbler must be an equal sharer in my reselling them. Otherwise, the multimillionaire must himself engage the cobbler for his own purposes and the cobbler may set his own price. Or else we must simply forbid the reselling at a profit of goods made for hire – at least if the goods are actually made, as goods ought to be, as we will consider presently.

Financing production through the selling and buying of “shares” in a “corporation” is also unjust when weighed against the principle that things belong to those who make them. That principle means that a corporation belongs to those who form and operate it, and its profits belong to those who actually produce the profits, not to those who merely lend money so that it may be formed and

operated and profits thereby produced. The moneylenders are not justly entitled to ownership in the corporation unless the real owners and operators happen to default on their loans; moneylenders ought to be recognized as such and ought never to be deemed “shareholders” entitled to a return proportional to the corporation’s profits; they ought to be entitled only to the return of the loan itself and to a rate of interest which was set when their money was borrowed and at which they may draw interest yearly until the loan itself is repaid.

The modern mode of mechanical production requires longer consideration than does “owning shares” or hiring production, especially as it is closely related to the latter abuse and is more or less removed from actual making, which is intentionally causing something to be what it is. A human can intentionally cause something to be what it is, only if the causing is his own action, done with his body and not merely directed by his mind. For man’s being a body with a mind as much as he is a mind with a body is what makes him human and not what Aristotle called a “pure intelligence.” The more directly a cause produces its effect, without having to affect intermediary causes, the better it is as a cause. A human is not two causes – a soul moving a body, and the body then moving other things – but is one cause (composed of spirit and matter) of movement in some

other things. He can be said to make a shirt by weaving with a “machine” only if the machine’s being moved is directly caused by his own moving – by his transmitting his own motion directly to the loom. If he merely pushes a button which initiates internal combustion or the flow of electricity in a wholly mechanical loom, he is not really making anything but only arranging for production to occur. In that case, he who intends production does not directly cause it and that which actually produces does not intend it. That might not be, strictly speaking, in itself unjust. Production which is not making is still production, and if things cannot belong to actual makers, they ought at least to belong to those who produce them by a lesser process. Laws enforcing such conclusions of natural justice need not retroactively penalize those kinds of money-making but might only forbid retention in the present of money wrongfully acquired. We could of course make laws which would forbid those practices in the present without being retroactive. We need not, perhaps, confiscate outright the real property (“Mammon”) of our former employers; confiscating “Lucre” with which they were able to maintain their “Mammon” might well induce them to divest themselves of enough of the latter for fair distribution. Sharing the seized Lucre among former employees of those who had

formerly held it wrongly would do much to bring about a fair level of general buying power. (Buying power now is practically monopolized; it's just that the monopoly as yet has not been exercised as overtly as it might.)

Adhering to our self-evident principles and their necessary implications ought soon to restore the real worth of parenthood and genuine joy in it. Parents could easily instruct their own children in the simple lore of serving justice and in at least the parents' own way of making a living which suited justice, so that professional schoolteachers would be needed only for the spreading out of parental education into really specialized fields, such as teaching the particularly gifted young some finer points of literary expression or instructing farm boys in the geology and chemistry of their own soils.

All of this might entail much effort and considerable hardship. Justice is worth that, if anything is. Any hardship which justice really demands is at worst only misfortune and never wrong. Doing wrong is always worse than having wrong done to us, and having wrong done to us is blameworthy for someone; but no one is to blame for what is only misfortune. Our very use of the word "blame" suggests injustice is worse than misfortune, but even misfortune's being able to seem the worse evil, or at least its often feeling to us as if it were worse, is what

makes it possible for injustice to be redressed by punishments of the kind our fellow citizens can impose on us. We ought, though, to school ourselves to be angry at that illusory appearance of harm and pain, by seeking to see with our own minds, as God wants to see (if religion is right), the beauty of at least a locally comprehensive performance of the application of the rules of justice and realizing how such seemliness is marred. That kind of anger, with which the heart of Christ (if Christianity is the right religion) was likely most fiercely alive on the Cross, might serve us well when pain was used to serve injustice. When our minds are thus fully alive, seeing any grave injustice then will “hurt” us more than anything else. And we will be content to have it so, since such suffering is most suited to injustice. If the Bible is right, we can guess that our first parents believed the lie that suffering is not thus consistent with doing wrong but that they would enjoy wrong as they had already been enjoying right, and that is what caused all the trouble.

Perhaps some people tend to equate causing harm, especially very painful harm, with doing wrong because in a very real sense it certainly is wrong to intend harm to anyone, just as in the same sense it is wrong to intend to kill anyone, even so that great good may come of his being killed. That is to say, it is

wrong to intend to harm anyone, or to kill anyone, simply so that he will be harmed, or dead. It is wrong to harm for the sake of the harmfulness, or to kill for the sake of the deadness, done to the person affected. But that is not the same as harming or killing which is only incidental to doing justice by redressing injustice; if we harm or kill thus because it is deserved, and do it not for justice to happen later as a result but rather harm or kill in the course of doing justice, the harm or death is not intended strictly as harm or death but as punishment merited; that kind of harming a man in the body is no more wrong than harming a man in his liberty by putting him in prison. The difference is like the one between a surgeon's having to cut off a leg to save the patient's life and the surgeon's being glad to destroy the leg because the patient had slept with the surgeon's wife: in the first case the cutting is part of lifesaving more than it is an action after which saving the life results; similarly, intending the execution of murderers ordinarily is part of intending justice; it is not like agreeing to kill a murderer whom another murderer especially hates so that this other will kill yet a third who murdered our mother.

Our conflating harm with injustice permits our tending to let the police usurp our right of self-defence and the right to defend what is our own; we are

encouraged to surrender our belongings when urged by the armed and violent who want them and to hope the police will soon get them back for us. That attitude assumes our being harmed must outweigh our being wronged. But our being harmed is made as bad as it is chiefly by its being wrong, and being compelled to give what we own to robbers wrongs us also. Faced with a choice of wrongs to be done to us, when we can't escape them all, we might well feel we may make without censure from officialdom that choice most suited to our own feelings with regard to what is our own. But those feelings may be modified by memory of the ways in which our belongings became ours. If we actually made for ourselves with our own living energy and personal skill some valued object a would-be robber chooses to demand, or if we obtained it from someone else who had made it thus in exchange for something we had ourselves made thus, our sense of outrage might give rise to wrath which some would-be robbers could find daunting or which prompts swift counter-action suddenly effective, especially if our mode of making something needed had kept us reasonably fit and healthy. That, I believe, would be the preferred response to attempted robbery. But today, when our possessions become ours only by a roundabout routine, it might not seem demeaning for us to let professional guardians so largely maintain our

ownership for us as to grant them a major interest in that ownership – if we admit that others’ causing things to be ours must mean that those things in part are also theirs. It might not be pure pride of possession which would prompt some men to die rather than surrender a belonging; it might instead be gratitude for having been granted great good by justice that we knew full well would not be ours forever.

(III)

MAKING, GENERATING, AND GOD

G.K. Chesterton said chastity isn't just a cold avoidance of sexual wrongdoing but a positive flame like the patriotism of Joan of Arc. That is to say, I think, that chastity is the sexual expression of a sharp eagerness to bring man to completion as the image of God on earth. For most of us, that means begetting more men, inspiring and nurturing in them the filial spirit, and being grateful for being allowed to do so much.

The filial spirit of gratitude is the spiritual essential element of service to God, of course, God being Who He Is, but men's being human almost strictly necessitates something in the flesh to be grateful for. And even begetting for God only "children according to the flesh" – if supernatural life were not given us and

we were restricted to life according to natural morality alone, knowing even that we were not to know Him face to face after death – were much cause for gratitude, as it may be even now in some who die without Baptism and who have not contravened His will; it is a great privilege to exist with an awareness of not having offended Him; it is even better to have consciously done what He wants. Even the purely physical pleasure of sex is not meant, as too many teach too many young people, to be an inducement or a reward for reproduction; rather, it was originally, I believe, a lower trace of pure spiritual delight in having done one's best to achieve one of the things God wants most; only the fall of Adam made the pleasure separable from that joy. All of this is best expressed by the saying that "He who has God and nothing else still has as much as he who has God and everything else." For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that thoughtful Christians are aware of that. The best things we can do, whether simply the best or only the best for ourselves, are the things God wants of us; some priests will say, "But that's spirituality!", as if spirituality were not part of all our lives and especially not of the practical aspects; the things God wants of us are our imitating Himself; sinners either don't imitate God or imitate Him selfishly; there is no getting away from our imitating Him rightly or wrongly.

Our being made in God's image means our human nature must reflect the Divine Nature as nearly and as much as possible. The great Christian writer of apologetics and detective stories, Dorothy L. Sayers, author of *The Mind of the Maker*, said the first thing known about God, and almost the most important thing before the Christian Revelation, is that He Makes everything else, so that men, to reflect His Nature, must also make good things. But another truth attainable by reason without revelation is that God is Self-Existent: He both "Does" and Is His own Existence; and only such a Self-Existent Being could make as God does. Therefore, human "makership" (the Anglo-Saxon for the Latin word "authority") must reflect a perfection of existence peculiarly fitting to man himself. And it does, or often does.

Our getting our own food, clothing, and shelter is our mode of maintaining the kind of existence proper to humans, which is holding body and soul in union; thus, we can "keep ourselves human" as God "keeps Himself Divine." Growing or hunting food is of our material necessities the one essential: we need food positively to sustain life, while clothing and shelter are needed only to protect that life from adverse circumstances external to it. Therefore people who grow food deserve best to be alive, and best deserve to gain by exchange the other

necessities, the providers of which ought chiefly to provide these for themselves and for those who grow or hunt food. Our economic life is a natural sacrament of the Divine, and Christians must see it more as a way of giving God glory than of getting what we ourselves want from selfish motives. To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, we are born not to acquire but to adore and to obey. Those who get a kick out of acquisition are just plain lucky that we can adore and obey by some, though definitely not all, ways of acquiring. Otherwise, we would be obliged to die rather than acquire.

That is to say, we are not allowed to seek wealth only in order to serve God with it after we have got it; we have to give glory to God also by our way of getting it. We are to give Him glory by our lives, and we have no guarantee our lives will last even beyond our deciding to acquire wealth by some particular means. Anyway, our chief need, even from our own point of view, is to give God glory; that is what the happiness of man is made of.

However, Revelation teaches more of God than His being Self-Existent Maker of all else: He Wills His own Nature; the Father generates the Son and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both of Them alike. Therefore, human reproduction is not just a lowly quirk of the animal kingdom which God raises in us to the dignity of

giving Him children; it is a direct emulation of God's own Essential Activity whereby He Himself is God. And that Revelation means that God's own "makership" could not be done by a "God" of fewer than Three Divine Persons; "He" would not be able to create. Not all merely theistic philosophers would realize this, but all Christians must hold fast to it, once we advert to it.

God, though Three Persons, is an Individual. Humans are individual, but human individuals differ from God in being unable to generate individually; the human generative unit is the family; man as family therefore is the most nearly perfect image of God that men can offer. For that image to realize completion, generation and "makership" must go together in the same human unit, reflecting the truth that God Himself is Infinite Simplicity. Our economic lives are not vehicles in which our food and clothing are delivered; economic life is rather the arm with which the Divine image feeds and clothes itself; the might of the modern mighty business corporation is due precisely to the family's using it, like a giant artificial arm developed apart from the body, to feed the family. The two legitimate economic roles for Christians, in this view, are families' supporting themselves in "assisted independence," and others' assisting families to be self-supporting so far as possible. Thus, plowmakers should assist farmers from a

preference, theological if not of personal taste, for farming. This is entailed in our minimal, primary duty to reflect God's image in our world. All wrongdoing is really measured by how far it departs from this positive ideal; making and begetting, and being glad to make and beget, are the norm for humans, not merely "normal" in the sense of being harmless. For God's glory is best reflected not in a single image highly complex and made of many parts but in the repetition, varying much in style and number of one simple image essentially unique, to convey an apt impression of the infinite richness of the One Divine Being. Man is himself, and "another Christ", not part of some other "super-creature". If he could be a higher creature, he'd be an angel. But he can't. The only other life he can live is God's, come down to him.

The family is the "basic" unit of society not in the sense, as some suppose, of being a necessary part thereof, but in being the reason – the basis – for society's existence. And society is not meant to "do for" the family what the family cannot; society is meant to consist of families doing together what they could not readily do by themselves alone; it is families' being self-sufficient with some assistance, to reflect dimly God's Self-Existence, and giving assistance to self-sufficiency.

This would be Divine Glory enough for men who were not yet Fallen; all their leisure arts would centre around and celebrate that heart of life.

We cannot do better than to do what God does in Himself. But we can try to please him in the details of our living as well as in our sense of general purpose. We might farm and cook not only to stay alive but to symbolize in taste and texture of food those virtues we would want Christ to be able to enjoy in our own souls; we might oversee the breeding of gazelles to represent grace and quickness we ought to have in avoiding our own temptations; we ought to preserve in elephants our merely animal impressions of the ponderous deliberation of Aquinas. And we ought to want to serve all these delights even in culinary fashion to Our Lord when he returns on the Last Day to receive the produce of His vineyard from us His tenants.

It may be said that we are image enough of God just by having intellect and will and not using them so as to offend Him. Avoiding offence is enough to escape damnation, but we are advised to be perfect as our Father in Heaven is perfect. And many may need a highly positive ideal just to avoid grave offence. Besides, our being images by nature can be enhanced by our being images in operation: we can accept the mode of existence proper to us as beings of matter

having intellect and will, but we cannot be principles of our thus reflecting by our nature the Nature of God, as the Father is a principle of His own Nature. However, we can will effectively the nature of our making manifest His glory as Maker and Begetter, thereby “generating” that mode of being His image.

Whether this “theology of family life” is compelling or even helpful, is for our Church’s bishops to decide, if they care to – or for the Pope if the bishops neglect it too long. But if they choose to consider it, they must do so on theological grounds and not on the basis of its confirming or opposing current economic theories or its potential for promoting world peace and the kind of “social justice” to which modern politicians “really” aspire if they but knew, as the bishops know for them. If they should for theological reasons really find this view compelling enough to validate on religious grounds the recovery of the family’s economic authority – “economy” is Greek for household management; “world economy” is a contradiction in terms – which Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc sought in preaching the “widespread distribution of productive property” they called Distributism, which most men are unlikely to follow without its having popular religious support.

If our bishops do decide that Distributism is entailed in our primary obligation to be God's image, they will further it little by recommending it to government through their own national conference. They must preach to their own people; the state is not an instrument of the Church; society first joins the Church and then establishes the state, in Christian countries; the hierarchy must learn to teach their flock directly, not try to have mere government do what rightly is their own duty; they ought to preach and pray in church that politicians will do what politicians ought; that might almost be enough to prompt the people to make the politicians meet their political obligations. Prompting the people is the proper role of bishops; though secular men cry, "Separation of church and state! Clergy mustn't meddle in politics!" when bishops tell us it's wrong to vote for certain policies or for politicians who promote these, that is only because the bishops then are usually preaching effectively; it's far more practical to ignore bishops' conferences – which are, curiously enough, treated with outward respect when they do cross the line between religion and government – than to scorn too many conscientious voters. After all, the hierarchy generally may tell us not so much how citizens ought to vote but rather how Catholics must not. The most hardened secularist can hardly object to the religious not voting.

Catholics must attend more to the will of God than to “political will” – after all, we are on Earth not so much to accomplish His Will as to submit to it; it is He who accomplishes – by, St. Thomas says, actually willing us to will freely when we choose aright, and suspending His own will when we choose wrong; we are to will what He wills, and He wills “mostly” to beget, to sustain Himself, and to communicate by making other things the Goodness of His own existing. We are simply to want Him to be God, and we are to be content that He alone is Good; that is what is meant by knowing Him as He is and sharing in His Life: seeing plainly that such Life belongs to Him alone; it is a paradox. We “seek first the kingdom of heaven” properly just by trying to “survive” with His approval but preferring death to any marring of His image in ourselves.

The impression that chastity consists chiefly in “not breaking the law” regarding sex may be grounded in an impression which many people may have had for a long time now that it is important and even necessary for us to be “made” to do God’s will: that, in effect, it is His Will which really matters, rather than His Reason, as if He could will anything at all at random, and His willing it would make it “right”; neither He nor anyone directing others for Him would ever have to make any of us “see reason.” He could choose to tell us we must have

children and we would then be obliged to have them regardless of our not then deeming that to be a good idea; we would never need to know what an excellent idea it is to have children – the most excellent idea naturally possible to our nature because having a Son is the best part of His own “Idea” of being God. He would be justified then, if mere “choice” rightly reflected the Divine, in “giving” us a “powerful sex drive” we were almost certain to satisfy and then in sending us down to eternal Hellfire if we satisfied it in ways He didn’t like. That is probably how many people today think about human reproduction: they may well feel “justified” in circumventing what they think is God’s constraining them, which they “think” He could have done far more effectively if He’d been really serious about it, so that being “unchaste” isn’t such a big deal after all. And assuming that sexual instinct is meant to make us do right despite ourselves can tempt us to try to excuse its leading us to do wrong despite ourselves.

Trying to please ourselves without sinning is the very spirit of sin and a source of other sins; it can often prompt us to “want sexual enjoyment without sin,” and wanting sexual enjoyment for its own sake, as those who deem it a suitable inducement to have children must believe we may, leads soon to being unchaste, if only through distracting us from the real reasons for having children. As Peter

Kreeft would say, real reasons are not mere motives but are truths of a kind accessible only to the faculty of reason. One of these is that it is a high privilege and a noble duty to make it possible for the self-evident truths of natural justice to continue being reflected in the material universe; making that possible is one of God's own reasons for creating matter.

In living as men ought, we are obliged “first” to be just for the sake of justice, both because God loves justice as himself (since his justice is himself; he would love it better than himself if it were not so) and because we ought to “render justice” to God himself. Justice is rendering what is due; what is due to God are generation and making; we must render these to him so far as we can. That means we ought to have as many children, if we marry, as it is feasible for us to raise justly. Who decides what is “feasible” in that sphere? We might suggest that those may decide what is feasible who really want to do as much as is feasible. (Since no one is judge in his own case, both parents must make such decisions together.)

We have evidence that God would love justice more than himself if justice allowed for that: he loves justice so much that he wants to find it in others than himself. Because of that, we ought not only to want to render what is already due to others but ought also to purvey that others will be available for more to be due

them. That is what God does. That is why generation is the ultimate in generosity – and why justice now demands it of us: generosity is due the generous. Also, of course, we can by ourselves beginning life (in others) begin to deserve in some degree our own having begun to live.

The idea that God “gave” us a strong sex drive to make sure the race would continue seems to me to be associated also with a general notion that duty is onerous, that joy is found in pastimes mostly trivial (like card-playing not done for money), and that pleasure when important is mostly found in sinning. That notion probably arose out of economic circumstances that caused earning (not “making”) a living for ourselves to entail working for others under conditions chosen by them without reference to permanent personal standards. This cannot help being onerous to men meant by nature and nature’s God to choose freely whether we would serve His justice or ourselves. But modern “education” has trained us to assume that this is the standard model of productive work.

(Cunningly, it did indeed train us to assume that instead of trying to demonstrate it to us by rational argument.) We have been taught that economic specializing allows us leisure for “personal growth.” Actually, such economic specializing trains us to feel that only our specialty is important, since it is what we do for a

living, and our leisure does not now celebrate that specialty of ours as leisure arts actually ought to celebrate our being privileged to generate and to make, so that our leisure instead becomes trivial.

Instead of “managing” us, as human exploiters do, to induce our doing what He wants, God desires to share with us, perhaps more than anything, His ability to “see reason” – because He is His own Reason; His goodness and greatness consist in His being Reason enough for His own existence. He is so perfectly Reasonable that even our unaided natural reasoning power not only directs us to the same courses of action as He “pursues” but it also shows us, once His tri-personal Nature has been revealed, how the self-evident principles of natural justice by which unaided reason must guide itself have their own true source in that very Nature.

That faith in reason which even reason requires can show us, even if we don’t yet see that God must exist, that if human life without Revelation has any meaning, the meaning must consist in the possibility of having justice done in the milieu of matter. That minimal sort of meaning is so minimally necessary to our lives that some of the best-intentioned humans we know reject God Himself because they think He is unjust. But if there is a possibility of having justice done

on earth, it consists in our accepting self-evident principles like: Things belong to those who make them; The servant is not greater than the master; and No one is judge in his own case. On that kind of principle are founded all reasonable law and all hope of spiritual profit. For justice consists in rendering to all what is their due, and the principle that Things belong to those who make them pretty much encapsulates everything that is due to anyone. But Christians must hold that God's Divine Nature itself must be the source of such principles, and even that all men are yet obliged to live by these even if unaware of Christian Revelation: We could say things belong to their makers mainly because in the Divine Generation, by which God Himself is able to Make, the Divine Son "belongs" – gives Himself – to the Father; no one is judge in his own case mainly because the Love of Father and Son has to be affirmed by the Third Person of the Trinity. And, of course, all who are not members of that Trinity are servants of God, while even He Who is generated by the Father and He Who proceeds from Father and Son are not greater than the Father even though they cannot be called His servants.

That those principles arise out of the Divine Nature, as it seems they must, makes the natural life of men, when conducted according to these, "worthy" to become part of the Divine Life, through Baptism, without any necessity for

Revelation to oppose the natural, except insofar as our nature is fallen. If man had not fallen, such principles as are self-evident to natural reason might have sufficed fully to guide our lives.

For instance, if man had not fallen, the principle that things belong to those who make them might have sufficed to guide us in serving God as Father: Since we owe our lives to parenthood, we must devote our lives to parenthood, whether in practicing parenthood, assisting it, celebrating it, or only defending it. This requires also that the functions of parenthood to which we owe our lives be confined to the activity of our parents: they two should work together by themselves with no essential help from others to make their parenthood effective; that is to say, their being employed by others ought not to be necessary to their being parents: what they do for others they ought to do mostly, and more directly, also for themselves. Others ought to benefit from parents' work only by partaking of the parent couple's making or growing more than they themselves need of something which they do in fact need. Two parents are necessary, because no one can weigh his own worthiness for parenthood, but also because, after the Divine manner, one person must generate and another consent to generation, but the human to be generated does not, unlike the Divine Son, yet exist in order to

consent. The one who generates and the one who consents to generation must be markedly different personalities, as different as man and woman, because the Father and the Son are so distinctly Personal.

Our nature's being fallen, which allowed us to feel strongly that harm and pain are worse than moral wrong, also allows us to feel we may seek whatever pleases ourselves so long as we do not do what displeases God: that we may do as we please as long as we "don't break the law"; we fail to realize that this very attitude might be what displeases Him most, especially if we incline to the notion that He is pleased more by His dominating His creation than by sharing with it what He sees to be right and seemly; that notion can foster a deep-seated, even if chiefly unconscious, sense of resentment against Him, especially if those who direct us in His law seem to do that chiefly out of fear and to find it onerous to teach, instead of gladly trusting themselves and us to Reason which perfectly comprehends what our reality requires.

The fulfillment of our reality requires that we accept God's guidance, whether we find it in Revealed Truth, in truths naturally self-evident, or in Revealed Truth as the source and consummation of truth accessible to unaided reason. If the latter had indeed been sufficient for man before His fall, then what chiefly has been

revealed is the means of forgiveness for having acted in contravention of what unaided reason found true.

Besides meeting the requirement for consent to generation by another, God's making man male and female allows males to represent – “only” represent – Christ and women to be (actually be) His Church, so that men become priests chiefly to offer to God the family life nurtured mostly by mothers. The consecrated life of celibate religious ought chiefly to be a life of prayer for the married to be good spouses and good parents and for every man on earth to look forward mostly to sharing eternally in the joy of all the women of his acquaintance at their having always chastely loved their own chaste Lord. Especially, any man disposed to feel that a woman is his “right” because she is “necessary to virtue” should perhaps pray that he will be after the general resurrection strictly an attendant, far more honoured than honorary, who only stands by, at the heavenly marriage banquet. For a woman's giving herself to her own husband ought chiefly to signify her desire to give herself to God; indeed, it ought to be her special mode of giving herself to God; that would increase rather than diminish her own love for her own husband. A man may be “another Christ” for his wife but he must never be so for himself, while the wife may truly be the

Church to her husband, since she is indeed both a member of the Church and a symbol of it, but a man is a member of the Church and only a symbol of Christ.

That a man ought to symbolize Christ and his wife should be the Church can help to clarify what St. Paul said about the obedience of wives to their husbands. It does not mean that a wife must do her husband's bidding; it means only that wives must follow their husbands' rules, so far as these are the rules of their larger society or of the Church and are more or less necessarily implied by the self-evident principles of natural justice; where these are not actually contravened, we find usually, in most families, that it is more often the husband who does the bidding of his wife. It is Christ who gives us general rules, but in particulars we mostly do the bidding of the Church. And that is most appropriate.

Such truths about parenthood and its service of natural justice must be taught, when taught to children, by the children's own parents; that is a responsibility which belongs to parents because the parents by having children "created" that responsibility; entrusting the teaching of those truths to people other than the parents of those who are to be taught will immediately tend to the denial of those truths, since it must in practice misrepresent them. Any who want children taught those truths must first make the children's parents see that they are true and that

they are necessary to our living justly. Or at the very least we must show the children that their own parents have had them wrongly taught, though most probably that was not their parents' fault but rather the result of a defective attitude long become "traditional."

It is not so much that we ought to "be" like God as that we ought to do as He does. We ought to generate and make and we ought to guide the generation of those lesser beings which also generate, following so far as we can God's own guidance of human generation. Since he shows us the best of all possible reasons for wanting to generate, we must guide the generation of animals and plants for the service of natural justice as rooted in Divinity. The generation of animals and plants must serve the essential purposes of human parenthood while "illustrating" human virtues fittingly reflected in plants and animals. That is why a Pope said agriculture is the highest art.

In our human exercise of the Fatherhood of God, males are more formally parents, so to speak, and so are called fathers, because they initiate generation, and mothers are more materially parents, in sustaining generation: men have the name and women the game, we might say. It might seem unfair, but the fact is that the truth ought to keep "mere fathers" humble: being able both to initiate and

to sustain generation must almost certainly make a parent arrogant if God allowed people to become parents thus. The divine truth that God's being eternal Father needs the Son's eternal consent, prevents us human males from being able to make ourselves fathers without the consent of those parents whom parenthood affects most.

The total exercise of parenthood – the life of the family – is chiefly what priests offer to God in the Mass. The priest offers; the family is offered; the priest has the name (of divine fatherhood) and the family has the game, we might say; dividing the functions thus, which is opposed mostly by people who insist elsewhere on much unnecessary division of labour, can help keep clergy humble; many priests especially ought to have welcomed that, when the laity regarded them more highly than now. The family's purpose is not providing priests with parishioners, any more than to provide teachers with pupils or states with citizens; the priesthood's purpose is to get us God's forgiveness, chiefly for neglecting our duties as family members. The Catholic family's purpose is imitating the God of Catholics as a union of persons which generates persons and makes what persons see would fittingly be made. The main failure of the clergy has been their failure to preach these truths.

When Catholic clergy return to preaching chastity as Catholics ought to practice it, they may well realize how well the self-evident principles of natural justice and their necessary implications ought to assist such preaching, since those principles govern even, or perhaps especially, what some call “sexual morality” as if it were different from morality in general; it is not different, except so far as adhering to moral principles can be more difficult with regard to sex. Our clergy’s arguments from natural principles may proceed thus:

Since things belong to those who make them, couples who enter into a marriage they intend to be permanent must have always afterward a permanent marriage; they could later make it impermanent only by traveling back in time to make it over into a temporary arrangement. The state could not later render it impermanent because the state had not made the marriage in the first place; only the spouses themselves had made it.

The principle that a servant is not greater than the master forbids any kind of artificial insemination: sperm and ovum, man’s and woman’s animal servants, ought not to unite unless their human masters have so united as to enable them to do that.

The principle that no one is judge in his own case forbids that one person alone might weigh his worthiness to be a parent; it requires everyone who wants children to submit to the judgement of another who is as different from himself as women are from men and who is willing to bear the whole responsibility for both if the other should be unable or should later shirk. This might encourage those considering marriage, when they intend it to be permanent, to weigh carefully the likelihood that he or she whom they intend to marry will indeed have the courage to bear the responsibilities of chastity and a responsibility for and to “economic” justice. For it is highly irresponsible to try to swim in any society, even one not much unsettled, with no dry land of one’s own to which to return; trying to live well by “contributing to society” is at best like trying to travel in quicksand however shallow.

(IV)

ABORTION, TRUTH, AND JUSTICE

Whether or not anyone holds it to be so, this truth is self-evident, as noted in earlier essays: Things belong to those who make them, to those who intentionally cause them to be what they are, whether by producing them or by maintaining them. Causing unintentionally is not “making.”

Any human who makes another human dead, deserves to be made a dead human, by another human. This is the difference between killing by accident and killing while insane: a human who is insane may be killed to prevent him from intentionally killing another, but a human may not be killed to prevent him from accidentally killing another. Killing a child in the womb to prevent his mother from being killed by her being pregnant with him is like shooting a woman

motorist to death to prevent her from running over a four-year-old child in the street.

This kind of argument usually is countered by saying a child in the womb is not human. The usual support for that position, now, in Canada, is that the Criminal Code says a child becomes a human being within the meaning of the Code when that child has wholly proceeded alive from the body of its mother. This law has been taken to mean that, whether or not he is in fact human, a child still in the womb even partly is legally not human; the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have assumed so far that this is what the lawmakers meant in making that law. But it is possible those lawmakers meant to extend legal recognition as a human being to any child who had somehow got outside the mother's body, whether or not the child then was in fact human, about which biological science when that law was made was in some doubt. (The section says the child becomes human "within the meaning of this Act when..."; it does not say "a child does not become human within the meaning of this act until...") The Supreme Court was probably remiss, and was at any rate obtuse, if it did not consider this possibility in its deliberations on this section. Consideration of the moral and legal environment when that section was enacted renders it likely that Parliament then

meant rather to confer than to withhold legal recognition of human status, as Parliaments today might confer, if it obeyed some people, legal recognition of human status upon some lower animals. That would not make the lower animals human but only protect them as if they were human. It is easier to confer protection than to alter nature, and trying to do the former is more likely to be found constitutional than attempting the latter.

The constitutional question here is whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms allows Parliament to deny legal recognition of human status to any class of creatures who are human in fact. If Parliament may deny legal recognition of human status to any such class, it follows that Parliament may deny legal recognition of human status to any other such class, for then that recognition depends not upon humans being human but on their belonging to a class. If Parliament may deny legal recognition of human status to children in the womb, it may deny that recognition to women, Jews, homosexuals, or non-whites, or to motorists who might be a danger to children while indulging in a luxurious privilege rather than exercising a necessary right. I suggest that a court competent to consider constitutional questions must deny that Parliament may withhold legal recognition of human status from any who are in fact human.

Whether a child of human parents is in fact human depends on whether his individual nature yet includes that part of a human which enables us to understand and to intend. Evidence that he does not yet employ that part, or lack of evidence that he does employ it, does not show conclusively that he does not include it. It could be part of him without his being developed enough to use it well. That a child in the womb might have an intellect with which he is not yet able to think for himself is no more incongruous than his having a body with which he is not yet able to fight for himself. “Intellect” is a “faculty” of that part with which we understand and intend: it is what we use in seeing truths like things belonging to those who make them or in seeing what other things really are which are made of matter; it is in seeing truths like things belonging to those who make them that we are operating at the highest natural level of our humanity; but we are not less than human when we are not aware of truths of that kind; we are human because we have the capacity to see such truths, not because we actually see them; if most of us when adult don’t see them, it is probably because we were conditioned by circumstances not to look. When we do look, carefully and with the right amount of interest, we find that truths like that must govern our making a living; they don’t rule only our being allowed to kill. If we are not certain that someone’s

being does not include that part of which intellect is a faculty, we may not act upon the assumption that he does not have it, or at least we may not act upon that assumption to the extent of taking a substantial risk that we commit murder by killing him.

Now, if all those who perform abortions and all those who have abortions done for them sincerely believe, really and truly, that abortion isn't wrong, and if no one who wants to stop them has any right to stop them, then neither they nor their opponents are guilty of any personal injustice, whatever the objective situation may be. All their killing incurs no more personal guilt than so many deaths in traffic accidents. But that is an awful lot of traffic deaths; if that many dogs or cats were killed in traffic, many people would demand a change in the conduct of many motorists; and a child in the womb must be as much a living animal as any cat or dog; I believe that ultra-sound has established that much.

To indulge a far-fetched fantasy, since we are talking so much about motorists, let us imagine that a terrorist organization, of really extremist terrorists, wants to demoralize the West entirely and reduce us all to walking if we want to go anywhere at all, thus thoroughly disrupting industrial transportation. These terrorists somehow manage to arrange lines of anesthetized four-year-old children

head to foot in more or less shallow trenches across many of our roads – I said this was far-fetched – and cover them with asphalt-coloured tarpaulins. A man with a loaded revolver discovers such a trench just as a motor vehicle is approaching him and it. He points his revolver to the sky and gestures to the driver to stop, some distance away; he is between the vehicle and the child-filled trench, and he is willing to die, if necessary, trying to stop that vehicle. If that motorist reverses his vehicle and speeds off in the other direction, or stops and gets out to see what's going on and decides to help, the man with the gun has saved the children, at least for now, and no one else has been harmed; no one else has really intended any harm, except for the terrorists, who now are nowhere near the place.

If, however, the motorist in question decides the man trying to stop him really wants to rob him, or worse, and is fiercely angry at the intended wrong, as he sees it to be, he may decide to run over the “would-be robber” for the good of society. Meaning to kill and trying to kill, he may then himself be killed. That is an imaginary situation which is somewhat like the situation today, throughout the west, with respect to abortion, as persons opposed to abortion would regard these situations. But the situations are not parallel. That motorist is not necessarily

personally guilty of doing wrong, if he believes attempted robbery warrants killing a would-be robber. The whole situation, as imagined thus, is simply utterly unfortunate. But in that situation, as imagined, it seems highly likely that the motorist will soon learn the enormity of his error and realize how horrible a misfortune it caused. And those of us who oppose abortion have not yet made those who promote it see it as the ghastly misfortune (at best) that we see it to be. The motorist is still going blithely on – as we see it – quite unaware of any differences in the surface over which he rides.

Trying to see things from the motorist's perspective by imagining that our highly imaginary terrorists more often place immobilized animals, of kinds kept as pets, in their shallow, tarpaulin-covered road trenches, so that motorists detecting tarpaulins on the road can't be sure whether they would be running over humans or animals, doesn't bring us much closer to seeing the matter in the same light as the pro-abortionists. For most pro-abortionists would refrain from running over the tarpaulin in such circumstances, even if certain it hid only beasts, unless their stopping were sure to result in the death of a human. We really must do better than that, since it is almost certain that life in the human womb must be

animal life at the very least, unless pro-abortionists claim to believe reasonably that children of human parents usually have only the life of plants.

Let us imagine now that our highly imaginary terrorist enemies aren't trying to disrupt our country's vitally important transportation system but "only" to destroy us morally so that we will not resist their invading us more directly when they're ready. What they do then is put highly unpopular people in their tarpaulin-covered road-trenches and give us highly urgent reasons, like saving the lives of those we love, to drive on the roads with which they have thus tampered. As we grow accustomed to such driving, the reasons become less and less urgent until we are driving everywhere just because other people pay us to do so, and until, indeed, we are paying one another, at different times and on different occasions, to drive over those roads for us. We have insisted on an unlimited right to choose where we will drive. Unfortunately we will most likely then have reached the point at which we will refuse to do anything but continue driving on in comfort, and especially refuse to endure any hardship in support or defence of our right to drive. Our terrorist enemies then can most likely invade with full impunity and with no further need of terrorism secretly planned. Or, if they are really nasty enemies who have loathed us utterly with no thought of gain for themselves, they may

simply leave us to stew in our own depravity. This last “scenario” sounds much the more plausible of the three we’ve imagined so far, doesn’t it? At least to those of us who oppose abortion?

We have said that none of those who believe abortion not to be wrong are subjectively guilty of injustice in seeking or promoting abortion, anymore than a motorist refusing in good faith to stop for someone on the road who ostensibly is trying to warn him but who might be a robber. But it might be something of a stretch to assume that absolutely everyone who seeks or performs an abortion really and truly believes there is no wrong at all in that; it seems possible and even probable that some people have abortions done, or even do them, in spite of seeing or at least feeling that it is terribly wrong; it seems unlikely that only those people who advocate abortion should have among them no persons who are insincere, as most other movements advocating freedom to engage in disputed conduct often do. Those who are insincere are taking advantage of the honestly “pro-choice” in order to escape punishment, for what they really deem a murder that they do, by those who agree with them that it is indeed murder. That dishonesty is what people who are honestly “pro-choice” ought most to resent, if only because the fact that it probably occurs must smear all of them. And people

who claim to see that abortion must be murder ought to resent being prevented from punishing these craven killers even more than being kept from interfering with those who are sincerely pro-abortion. It is in the interest of all of us, both “pro-choice” and “pro-life,” to prevent people from thinking they can get away with murder, since we cannot know which of us they will turn against next. The real issue here is resistance to the imposition of morality; we who want to punish abortion do not want to “impose our own morality” on others: we want only to practice it properly with those who have already accepted our morality or with those whom we can convince that they ought to accept it. And so far we are barred from doing that, by others who have already imposed their morality on us – at no hardship or risk to themselves.

These truths also are self-evident, whether or not anyone holds them to be so: “Everyone should know what is true”; “Those who know what is true may not deny it, nor may they even appear, unambiguously, by their own intent, to deny it”; “Those who know what is true may, and sometimes even must, proclaim it to others”; “Those who know what is true may, and sometimes even must, defend it by acting upon it when others deny it by acting against it.”

If we see a truth to be self-evident, and see implications to follow necessarily from it, we may reasonably assume that others who are capable of seeing truth will accept these, if they are honest, when they are properly pointed out to them, and that those who don't accept such truths may reasonably be punished for dishonesty, especially if they act, to the detriment of another and for their own benefit, upon that refusal. If we honestly do not see a truth after others have professed to point it out properly, we may reasonably assume that it is not self-evident or logically necessary and that those who claim it is self-evident are trying to bamboozle us for reasons best known to themselves, especially if they act, to the detriment of another and for their own benefit, upon what they profess. Government ought to punish those who act thus to the detriment of others. At the very least, this kind of "conflict of convictions" cries out for a fair test of sincerity on both sides.

That fair test of sincerity is not found in our merely voting for the kind of government we want, unless the election of a government we don't want really is difficult for us to endure. But that does not seem to be the result, for most of us, of our getting governments we vote against; we are content to let the election of a government stand as the resolution of our political disagreements; we are content

to let those whose coming to power we “opposed” use that power to impose on us policies and measures of which we profess to disapprove, so our disapproval must have been at best only half-hearted. We might as well, if that is our attitude to politics, spare our country the enormous expense of elections; we might as well let anyone assume power who wants it, until we are willing to endure real hardship to put him out of office. We might as well allow all who want political office to decide among themselves the kind of contest in which they will compete for it; that would be quite as rational as what we do now. For, as things stand, we seem to be agreed that millions of citizens mustn’t impose the policies they approve, because their using the properly democratic way of appointing representatives who ought to enforce those policies results in the imposition of policies those citizens profess to condemn. On the other hand, of course, voting isn’t valid, or even rational, unless all the voters agree to accept the result of the vote.

We could resolve this kind of contradiction by settling political disputes we really care about, before appointing officers to enforce the settlements or electing representatives to legislate the settlements. The methods we selected to settle our disputes could depend upon how much we cared about them. If our opponents

cared enough for their position to fight to the death for it, in a fair fight, and if we did not care so much about our own position, we ought then to yield to our opponents and let them impose on us the policy they approve, unless they are prepared to go their own way, with their own political identity, and to let us go ours as a separate political identity. “Better politics hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his policy.”

Now, no one in our democratic countries today seems to deny that the democratic way of life is worth dying for. We send soldiers out to die for it all the time. But saying that such democracy is worth dying for, now means only, if it means anything, that even a remote possibility of being able to live, through taking part in elections, under laws you deem just – laws which punish or laws which permit abortion – is worth dying for. But if that is so, an even more immediate likelihood of living under laws you deem just must be even more worth dying for, especially if that likelihood increases in direct proportion to your willingness to die and if the likelihood of actually dying decreases in like measure; if war for democracy is justifiable, then civil war within a democracy must be even more justified, since the only practical way to prove a man insincere when he says his laws are worth dying for is to try to kill him.

Sincerity in politics and in devotion to self-evident truth and its necessary implications, and in devotion to the sense of justice that will resist what cannot show itself to be true, can all be proven by our fighting fairly to the death, or to such outcome as the fighters can agree upon, for those causes. The best way to allow for that kind of proof without incurring the chaos of all-out civil war, is to set up, as suggested in an earlier essay, a formal system of “civil duels” in which citizens would fight each other over policies about which they cared enough to do that. Policies about which no one cared enough to fight, whether for them or against, ought simply to be dropped. In the absence of a legalized system of civil duels, the courts ought to hold that since the Charter’s recognizes the principles of fundamental justice, citizens have the right to settle disputes over vital policies by fighting over them, fairly, where contraventions of their own positions occur. At the least, a citizen may place himself so as to hinder such a contravention and may then resist fairly any attempts to hinder his hindering it. The only duty of the police in such a case would be to charge with assault those participants in such a contest who resorted to fighting unfairly, or to make sure that the fighting did not endanger non-fighters.

Adherence to “the rule of law” well understood must imply, as noted earlier, that the rule of law has its own foundation, quite independent of how anyone wants the law to rule. If the rule of law has not such an independent basis, the “rule of law” means only the rule of those who make the laws. And since things belong to those who make them, laws which men make are binding only on those who make them: the rest of men may certainly decline to obey those laws or those men. Only those laws which are derived from what all men must see to be true are really binding on all men. What all men must see if they are to make laws binding by any authority other than consent includes: things’ belonging to those who make them, as already mentioned; no one’s being judge in his own case; an agency’s being no greater than those who authorize it; the right of all to have what is their due; and the duty of all to render what is due from them to others. If the force of law depends upon consent, men may deny that force by withholding consent for the law.

There is some urgency for urging upon “pro-choice” and “pro-life” alike the validity of the arguments presented here, while babies are being killed daily in the womb. Acceptance of these arguments by the “pro-life” is necessary to show that the latter really believe abortion is murder, and resistance to such arguments by

the “pro-choice” can be deemed honest only if the resisters are willing to endure equally what men who would enforce these are ready to bear: both sides must be manifestly seen to be defending what they deem to be justice rather than seeking with no risk their own particular convenience. And if the “pro-choice” engaged merely mercenary police and military – lacking other principles than greed – to inflict upon the brave and the free, with an overwhelming might of “professional” armament provided by politicians, the tyranny which “pro-choice” sloth “demands,” then that kind of tyranny must steadfastly be denounced even from “underground” if necessary.

If people on both sides of the abortion question don’t recognize fairly quickly that they must promptly accept or reject the arguments presented here, and must act upon their acceptance or rejection by formulating public policy, then people who agree that these arguments justify defending unborn humans fairly effectively ought to get down to business. G.K. Chesterton said that the alternative to having matters settled in black and white is having them settled in black and blue. It may be that setting about settling matters in black and blue is sometimes necessary to prompt people to settle them in black and white. But acting effectively to prevent abortion may be better justified than insisting upon

punishing abortionists. For punishing them would probably require proving that the babies were indeed human, or establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the abortionists recklessly didn't care whether the babies were human, but keeping anyone from preventing abortion, or punishing him for preventing it, would require proving that the baby thus protected was not human.

That no one is judge in his own case forbids us all from deciding “what's right for me”; we are obliged simply to settle in black and white what is actually right universally and to conduct ourselves accordingly. Even a judge in a court of law is not qualified to assess his own qualifications; he can establish his capacity to judge, to the satisfaction of the citizens who authorize his judging, only by making findings that accord well with such primary and elemental truths as things belonging to those who make them and an agency's being subject to those who authorized it.

A government's being subject to those who authorize it means that people who did not vote it into office, and who did not signify by taking part in its election that they would accept its being authorized by others, are not obliged to obey it; they ought to have a different government of their own. If the same government claims actually to rule legitimately both those people who want

abortions performed and those who want abortion punished, it ought to side with neither of those factions and ought to refrain both from punishing abortion and from punishing those who try to prevent abortions. Otherwise, one of those groups is actually governing both the other and itself, through an instrument proper only to itself, which in the case of the other certainly is not democratic self-government.

We ought not to call on government to “protect the right to life,” as so many “pro-life” people are so prone to do. We have a right not to be killed unless we try to kill, but we do not have a “right to life.” All our lives are gifts from others, and no one has a right to be given a gift, though we all have a right to accept gifts which others give us. Our actual “right to life” is only the right to the kind of life we can make for ourselves without infringing on anyone else’s right to make a similar life for himself. Everyone has a right to support himself with minimal assistance or by providing such minimal assistance to others. A child in the womb or a child just born is unable to support himself. The question now is whether those who were responsible for giving him life, as all must be who engage in coition with a minimal awareness of its natural purpose, are responsible for making sure the gift remains given until the child himself is able to maintain it for

himself. If there is a responsibility for making sure the gift remains given to the child, that is the responsibility of his parents; they “made” that responsibility when they intentionally incurred the chance of generating him. If any parents have that kind of responsibility, all parents do; the responsibility exists, if it exists, because they are parents. Also, because we owe our lives to parenthood we must devote our lives to parenthood, whether by exercising it, celebrating it, defending it, or assisting it. Those who default on that debt ought to be punished, either in this life or in the next.

Some say the worst thing a couple can do is to bring into the world a child who is not wanted. We can take them at their word if they will concede that women’s wombs are in the world or are part of the world. Then the wrong becomes taking any chance of generating a child whom its parents do not want. We could insist on capital punishment for that terrible wrong, to be inflicted upon the child’s father if not necessarily upon the mother. We could insist on capital punishment for any man taking the slightest risk of begetting a child who might be aborted, and the mother’s actually having an abortion would be proof positive that such a risk existed when the father begot the child. How’s that for equalizing men and women with regard to the dangers of pregnancy? Might it not also prompt men to

defend effectively the “right” of those they “love” to have abortions? Or ought not a woman, before engaging in coition, to secure a recorded promise that her “lover” will fight to the death to defend that “right” for her if she should choose to exercise it?

We’ve already shown how truths like things belonging to their makers must govern economics as much as they do questions like that of capital punishment. That ought to have revealed the magnitude of our modern neglect of Truth and made clearer the necessity of Truth to criminal justice. For justice isn’t even justice unless it is truly justice. Clear statements like those made in these essays about what is due to whom and why may well be the kind of “new political realities” which the Supreme Court of Canada has said the Canadian constitution ought to be able to accommodate. Our having not noticed that such clear and exact manifestations of the elements of natural justice are actually available, might largely be why modern jurisprudence has mostly been vague about the subject of justice itself.

Lack of exactitude on the subject of justice might be largely why so many moderns assume that the chief duty of a government is to protect its citizens, at least from foreign enemies. But the first duty of government is upholding justice

against its own citizens – by punishing them when they are unjust, one to another. Its next duty, if it is indeed the next duty, is to organize its citizens against unjust attack from without – not simply against any attack from without but against unjust attack. I say “if it is a duty,” because citizens might prefer to organize under another aegis than that of government for their own defence; the duty of government then would be to punish citizens who used unjust methods of defence. Or citizens might assign their government only the duty, with regard to defence of their country, of punishing men who failed to defend their country when and as they ought. But the notion that government ought to defend its citizens against harm, while the primary duty to uphold justice, and especially to uphold justice against the government’s own citizens, is overlooked, leads almost logically to government’s “defending” mothers against the children in their wombs. For the mothers usually are citizens in a “fuller” sense than their children are, in the sense of being able to exercise the rights and duties of citizenship, and (once the government and its citizens no longer have a clear and exact idea of justice) harm is harm is harm: there is little difference, to the citizen who really fears being harmed far more than he fears to do wrong, between being harmed by a foreign enemy and being harmed by being pregnant; citizens then see the

government, for which they vote, as having equal obligation to protect them from both. And then, since death from illness or starvation is just as much harm to citizens as is being shot by a foreign soldier, the government would seem obliged to protect its citizens from fatal disease or starvation. All this can be avoided by confining government to upholding those rights which are strictly ours in natural justice and by insisting that it do so.

In the meantime, it is utterly imperative that we impress on those not yet aware of it how imperative it is that self-evident truths be acknowledged and that the self-evident principles of natural justice be upheld; we absolutely must establish, to our own satisfaction and to theirs, that people who don't acknowledge these things and who act, to the grave detriment of others, as if these things were not true, are plainly enemies of justice itself or at least of us who believe that truth and right are real, and that those people ought to be fought fairly and directly and physically, at least until they prevail by dastardy, and then we must not cease to proclaim them dastards.

We must insist that if human life has any meaning, that meaning is found in serving justice: in our rendering to others whatever is due to them from us. One thing which is due to them from us is our respect for their right to own what they

make, and that includes our insisting that they own up to it when they do wrong. It is almost self-evident that without justice human life has no meaning except as an exercise in choosing anything we like that we have the power to get. But if life consists truly in the service of justice, if our life belongs to justice, it follows from our first principle of justice, if our kind of reasoning is valid, that either we were made by justice itself or whatever did make us is itself just; if we belong to justice, justice or something that is just must have made us, since things belong to those who make them. If that kind of reasoning is not valid, then it seems likely that human life merely happened to develop through evolution, but it still seems clear that it did develop into the kind of life that often cares whether there is any justice in the world. If the only real ability we have is the ability to make raw choices, we can still make the “raw choice” to insist on justice: we can choose to insist that we must be punished by others if we are unjust to others and that others be punished if they are unjust to us. This may mean only, to some, that we insist on making life a grim game for ourselves and them, but the exercise by everyone of “raw choice” can hardly help making life grim for some at least, when we consider what some people’s raw choices have been, and seeing life as almost any kind of game, as opposed to a sheer chaos of grabbing by all who want to grab, must at

least lend it some sort of intellectual interest. The human mind seems to insist on finding some meaning somewhere.

Those who insist that the only meaning of life consists in choosing any course of action we have the power to maintain, cannot logically object to our choosing to enforce justice if we have the power of endurance necessary to uphold it against any pain or harm they might be able to inflict on us in defence of their adherence to “raw choice.” Establishing which of these versions of the meaning of life inspires more power to endure on its behalf, might reasonably test which of them is really the more reasonable. Paying others to be “stern to inflict and stubborn to endure,” as most pro-abortion citizens would probably prefer to pay police and military instead of personally imposing or defending their own right to “raw choice” and personally enduring opposition to that, would not be a valid test of the kind suggested here. Police and military who might be paid to uphold such an extreme “pro-choice” position ought to realize that they would thereby be maintaining the insincere in insincerity, and only those police and military who sincerely held that view themselves would be at all warranted in defending it by force with power given them by others or with which others had at least allowed them to provide themselves. But again, this might only be a futile attempt to apply

reason to a world which the “pro-choice” hold is utterly unreasonable and in which it is “logical” to hold that things belong first to those who are willing and able to spend most money for them, rather than to those who make the things.

Those who choose to serve justice must realize that serving it is more like dancing a dance than building a building. We must learn to enjoy what we are doing, and to enjoy doing only what is just, because it is just, rather than try to achieve. We must stop regarding sexual experience, for instance, as something to be achieved and in which we will have found our purpose when we have achieved it. Pleasure is not a purpose but is something to be found only, if we do find it, in seeking our true purpose. We ought not to have been taught to find joy in getting what we aim at and in having that, and we ought not to teach our children to seek their joys thus. For humans largely learn from their elders, said C.S. Lewis, what they “ought” to enjoy, and we have not been taught in recent decades that what we ought most to enjoy is the practice of justice. Those of us who realize this defect in our training ought to try to train ourselves to relearn true enjoyment, and to teach ourselves to be angry, really angry, at misfortune’s ever seeming to anyone to be worse than injustice. That kind of anger may have been absolutely

necessary to most Christian martyrs in their sufferings, though we hardly ever hear it suggested that Christ Himself must have felt it most strongly on the Cross.

It is not enough to recommend regarding abortion or any other murder, or serious theft, with that kind of rightful anger, for an effective defence of life must defend the kind of life which is worth dying for. That would be the kind of life in which every important aspect of it actually serves justice; it isn't worth our lives to fight injustice in one area if it flourishes in others. That might be why some women now are afraid to die we in order to give life to their children; mere survival certainly is not worth dying for; anyone who really values it is pretty well compelled to live for it; doing otherwise would be self-contradictory; I don't think most soldiers are ready to die just to help their countries survive; I think they risk death to keep their countries from being unjustly conquered; or they feel at least that somehow it would be unjust for their country to perish. But countries in which injustice flourishes by common consent of their citizens ought to perish or be punished. To die for a child in one's womb, I think, one would have to believe firmly that giving that child an opportunity to serve justice is not only absolutely the best thing one could do for the child but is in the circumstances simply the best thing one could do. But as things stand in the world today, it seems unlikely

that a child whose pregnant mother was tempted not to let him go on living would actually grow up to serve justice well. He would almost certainly not serve justice in the nearly all-important matters of keeping himself fed, clothed and sheltered, for, so far as illustrating the truth that things belong to those who make them is concerned, our modern economic and political lives are utterly a mess. And almost everyone today seems to think he can be judge in his own case. But the self-evident principles of natural justice will confirm any aspect of the traditional structure of morality to which we can think of applying them, and we ought to apply them to every such aspect, so as to convince all women so far as possible that they ought to try to make every child's life worth living. That we have not thought much lately of applying those principles anywhere and of enjoying that process with a spiritual joy which disapproves of our not actually deriving pleasure from it also, may be due partly to our not having had for a long time the freedom to follow our own natural instincts and to our being obliged to do the will of others in order to acquire for ourselves anything we need. Even when another's will compels us to serve justice, it is that other whom we primarily obey and not justice itself. Justice would prefer that we serve it by choice and that we be punished if we freely choose wrong, not that we be punished in serving it. But we

ought also to be ready to incur in a fair fight, or by way of unjust persecution, severe punishment even for merely failing, though we tried hard indeed, to enforce justice properly.

There may still be those who say that all this kind of argument is only an instance of the capacity of the human mind for manipulation to secure whatever we happen to feel like wanting, which is the sole capability, according to them, that evolution caused our minds to have. To such people we should perhaps say only: “All right, then, this is what we want: What will you do to stop our getting it?”

(V)

JUSTICE AND THE CHURCH

If our economic activities are not meant merely to enable us to worship God but are meant actually to be part of truly Catholic worship, as an earlier essay has said they are, then so far as a Catholic's economic activity serves a wider social context or proximate corporate interest, that should be his parish. And work is worship – *laborare est orare*. In it we freely worship God or Mammon, or we serve, more or less voluntarily or more or less under constraint, or more or less unthinkingly, worshippers of God or of Mammon.

People who worship together ought to perform their work-as-worship together. Therefore members of Catholic parishes ought promptly to discuss together whether they are helping one another, so far as is feasible in the circumstances, to provide, each family for itself, their own food, clothing, shelter, necessary recreation, and means of celebrating being able to provide these other four necessities. And they ought to discuss, if that kind of co-operation in being self-supporting is not currently feasible for them, how their circumstances might be

altered to render it more feasible; almost any degree of greater feasibility for it would be desirable.

For instance, a Catholic congregation might pose organized opposition to municipal legislation forbidding the raising of rabbits for meat or chickens for their eggs or flesh, and might insist on more rational regulations forbidding that kind of domestic husbandry from becoming a public nuisance. The parishioners might even agree, and might persuade their other neighbours, if those are of independent mind, to put up with minor botheration of that sort rather than deny the human right to provide at least some of our own necessities in a manner somewhat more than merely symbolic. And since the obligation to follow natural justice must be taught by the Catholic Church, local regulations forbidding men to raise their own meat could be opposed as violating constitutional freedom of religion when they also violated natural justice. Besides, we could suggest quite plausibly that local laws banning local animal husbandry are meant to further, by keeping most of us dependent upon, the interests of corporate agribusiness or the interests of other corporations which would prefer that we rely more on their wages than on our own real abilities.

We might well suggest also that Catholics who cannot without severe hardship avoid working in unjust modes of employment should be so grateful for avoiding the hardship at least that they do not throw themselves heart and soul into the more or less meaningless or even malign comforts and entertainments with which corporate employment is naturally complicit. For, as things are, some rather anile amusements of a thoroughly industrial and commercial society may be necessary to anesthetize the spirit so as to render endurable or even enjoyable our experience of being economically exploited. To become at least aware of that experience, most employees of industry or business should at least engage their own efforts in producing their own recreations. For one instance, rather than purchase membership in a fitness club or pay weekly fees to it, one might simply buy a book of fencing instruction and a three-pound dumbbell and spend time at home practicing saber cuts and parries, advances and retreats. When sufficiently experienced in these, married couples might dispense with the weights and execute the movements to dance music, for a change of pace. This suggestion might also prompt most ordinary men to acquire a modicum of practical skill in self-defence with an axe handle or a three-foot piece of three-quarter-inch pipe, which need not themselves be swung about with risk of damage to furniture.

Money which mere employees saved by eschewing expensive entertainments and fancy foods might well be better used to finance, at honest rates of interest to provide a return income in old age, the genuinely (domestically) economic enterprises of actual makers and growers. We might even get a new religious order dedicated to that kind of frugal way of life for the good of others, whose members would vow to accept “alien” employment only so long as it was utterly requisite. This order might have to be a kind of “secret society” to render its members “employable.”

Distinguishing between the luxuries offered by corporate industrialism and those things it produces which may be utterly necessary to some of us while we make the changes to society which justice demands, should prompt us to separate the luxurious and the genuinely necessary uses of the motor vehicle and to forbid the former. Limiting motor transport to genuine necessity would probably allow many to save much money by sharing ownership of relatively few motor vehicles, as Catholics in the same parish ought readily to co-operate in doing. Where urban areas must import food, which is to say where people must live in urban areas, Catholic parishioners might form a corporation to contract with a farming Catholic parish to supply most or much of that food, and might challenge, as

naturally unjust, laws forbidding “religious discrimination in business” which might interfere with that kind of co-operation. (“Catholic socialism” would not be the objective of such “corporate” mutual assistance; it would be aimed at enabling all to do as much as possible for themselves, eventually, which is not the direction in which corporate capitalism is headed at all.) The chief obstacle to limiting motor transport to its necessary occasions may well be that such frugality would make employment in corporate commerce intolerable and vice versa. But that would mean we ought to put up with that sort of incompatibility until it drives us to purge the alternative rightly deemed intolerable.

The Catholic parish ought to have its own particular tribunal to censure derelictions from justice not yet the subject of municipal, provincial, or federal law, or which those kinds of laws wrongly approve. The parish could also organize to seek remedy of municipal, provincial or federal laws deficient in these respects, or it might, in conjunction with its counterparts in other parishes, lead actual physical opposition of Catholics to “secular” law which imposed grave injustice upon them, if not against law which allowed citizens to do grave injustice.

Parish members could agree that their parish tribunal only would deal with any accusations of misconduct arising strictly within the parish membership, as of theft, for instance, by a parishioner from a parishioner. The tribunal could perhaps be manned by a retired judge from the federal or the provincial jurisdiction or by a moonlighting lawyer, to deal with accusations of unjust conduct for which no higher government mandates an accuser's pressing charges in that government's own jurisdiction. This might well require that the Church itself insist, against provincial and federal governments, that the principle of subsidiarity confirms the democratic right of people in a "mere local area" to agree upon punishments they all deem fitting both for an offence they might commit and for the same offence if committed against them. It might require the Church to insist that a higher government's abrogating such local law of Catholics violates the constitutional right to freedom of religion.

At the very least, Catholic parishioners learned in the lore of self-evident natural justice – which is lore not difficult of access – could offer citizens of a municipality a channel of united and determined resistance to unjust municipal legislation, such as that which requires citizens to ask permission to build on their own property instead of requiring them to know and obey the local building

regulations (or to defy these upon principle. That kind of piddling regulation can be a perfect example of government cramping justice instead of taking the trouble to enforce it by punishing actual injustice. Parish lore of law and justice, and the clergy themselves, might encourage parish members to challenge to a local equivalent of the civil duel any non-parishioners who insisted that piddling municipal legislation be upheld despite parishioners' having demonstrated by logical argument from self-evident truth that such legislation offended natural justice, perhaps by reason of its enforcing what was only mere taste and not any valid principle. Such resistance would at least require that any merely esthetic principle being enforced must be explicitly enunciated and acknowledged, with even merely municipal regulators knowing what they are doing and why.

Enforcement of natural justice in a parish, though subject of course to the laws of the Church and the regulations of its own diocese, unless these happened to contradict natural justice, as some clerical legalisms certainly can, must be strictly a function of the laity, to whom the lore of natural justice is readily accessible by human reason without the aid of that Revelation with which clergy are chiefly concerned. (The clergy indeed, by virtue of education in philosophy, might teach the laity the actual rules of rational argument, called logic, in which secular

“public” schools seem to offer but little learning.) This kind of exercise in self-government ought to foster a high degree of esprit de corps in any parish.

The Catholic Magisterium ought immediately to declare the faithful laity their Church’s ordinary authority on the principles of natural justice and her upholders and enforcers of the deep and rigid separation of Church and state demanded by those principles so that never again will a Catholic ecclesiastical corporation be subject to secular law as “episcopal corporations” have been, to the great detriment of the lay faithful. For bishops’ having set up those corporations in order to have the state protect church property, or in order to conform with secular laws regarding employer-employee relations, has caused church property provided and maintained by the faithful laity to be treated as if it were the peculiar property of a bishop’s episcopal office and therefore subject to distraint according to secular law to provide compensation to the victims of a bishop’s being remiss in his responsibilities as an “employer” of priests who abuse children. Allowing episcopal corporations to be subject to secular law has also resulted in letting insurance companies try to dictate at least some circumstances of sacramental confession and maybe even, it has at least been hinted, eventually to deny

penitents their right to private individual confession, which all faithful Catholics ought to want.

Catholic ecclesiastical bodies ought to be subject to regulation by the Church only; Catholic citizens, including bishops, ought to be subject to secular law only so far as they personally are citizens and not by reason of their being Catholic; there ought to be no “Catholic corporate citizens.”

Since “faith does not contradict reason,” Church law must not contravene natural justice, which is what bishops do when they assume personal ownership, or at least ownership by reason of their office, while they hold office, of property provided and maintained by lay people for purposes which are chiefly purposes of the laity: purposes in which bishops, priest and deacons are obliged to serve the laity: chiefly to bring lay people Divine forgiveness for lapses in service to the principles of natural justice derived from the Divine Nature or for even more serious offences against Divinity as revealed in Christianity.

Since faith does not contradict reason and natural reason alone serves to recognize the principles of natural justice and their logical implications, the initiative in upholding natural justice, even against defective clerical legalisms, ought to lie with the laity, who ought to be ready to endure even

excommunication in that cause; for any laymen undeservedly excluded from the sacraments for pursuing justice can, one ought to hope, expect to receive from God himself the grace to live a good life “without benefit of clergy.”

However, excommunication ought to be the clergy’s chief punishment and instrument of deterrence against laymen who fail to uphold the right of the Church, and her duty, to rely upon her laymen for protection, in any physical sense, of her rights against any secular authority. And the Church herself, through her Magisterium, ought alone to say what her rights are; these ought not to be subject in any sense to any secular authority which cannot show that her claim contravenes a principle of natural justice.

Excommunication ought also, perhaps, to be applied, after public discussion and advance warning, of maybe a decade or two, against those Catholics who engage in those economic practices which contravene the principles of natural justice as discussed in previous essays or who engage in any provision of wealth – which is what “servile work” must usually mean – not strictly necessary on Sundays and other holydays of obligation. It might not be too far a stretch to suggest that orthodox clergy might, after due discussion and admonition well in advance, also excommunicate any who use motor vehicles in other circumstances

than real emergency, or who promote as ordinary the unnecessary operation of such vehicles even to make sure they would be available in such emergency, since our previous discussions of economic production must imply that such reliance on machines deriving movement from an inanimate process rather than from those who can move themselves is at the very least ordinarily “beneath the dignity” of people with a proper regard for the principles of natural justice. It may accurately indeed be called putting the cart before the horse.

There is almost certainly no obligation to have motor vehicle transport made common even if only thus can it be made available for emergencies: While *abusus non tollit usus* – condemning an abuse of any good need not abolish its rightful use – yet if the only way to starve an abuse is to withhold the rightful use, this must be allowed unless the rightful use is actually a duty, and we have no duty in justice to tolerate anything morally unworthy for the sake of merely bodily well being, quite apart from any possibility that most emergencies served by motor ambulance have their source in motor vehicle accidents or may result from heart attacks suffered because of failure to walk or run regularly. Being compelled by “economic circumstances” to employ the morally unworthy is simply economic oppression and even, when promoted by politicians who sought power

by proposing to regulate it in everyone's "best interest," political oppression. Our being taught to enjoy what is morally unworthy may accurately be called animal husbandry. People who rightly regard justice ought at least to be concerned that their being allowed to use motor vehicles is a privilege granted to them by their government rather than a right on which they may insist, and they ought also to be concerned to insist that any indulgence in privilege, as opposed to the exercise of actual rights (which exercise, in two meanings of that word, ought to be practically universal), must be as safe as possible, most especially for those among whom the privileged indulge their privilege, and it ought also to be, even though legal, legally rare. We may even have a duty in religion to show fittingly a deep gratitude to God for having made available for employment by us the various living creatures superior to ourselves in merely bodily ability who are yet amenable to our guidance of them, so that we would even less be tempted to raise the inanimate to usurpation of the alive. The discernment of patterns in matter and the gleeful ingenuity in devising new ones, which now are applied to inventing new gadgets, could be better employed in learning the "inner workings" of those living creatures and breeding them, by way of their natural mode of generation, to be even better servants of the servants of justice. The more mechanical-minded

among us, indeed, might not be equal to such challenges; their spiritual gifts might be more suited to “dominating” mere inanimate matter which God made to be moved by the alive and which in fact can be moved and employed even by mere vegetation. It is wholly reasonable, therefore, that promoting mechanical progress encourages most men to vegetate and even to demand, through formation of employees’ unions, the “right” to vegetate, much to the chagrin of employers who want all men to compete keenly in improving upon processes merely mechanical or else to remain unemployed. Those who thus “vegetate” at least mentally are not asserting their right, but shirking their duty, to deserve that they remain alive by pursuing life and “living reason.” For life is movement arising within the thing moved, and the faculty of reason is the thing most deeply within us, so that we must desire to get what we want only so long as reason shows we merit it. Facility in operating machines lends itself to one’s viewing that employment, even while one is employed, in the light of enjoyments to be gained (indirectly) from it, and to one’s foreseeing oneself enjoying them, instead of requiring that reason attend strictly to the task in hand as it usually must in real making, from which the maker may later relax in contemplation of its fuller context, fitly forgetting himself in both work and rest.

Since the duties of charity are in the purview of the Church and are no business of the state, a bishop's excommunicating luxuriously rich people in his diocese who obstinately refrain from directly helping the unfortunate would accord far better with Catholic social-justice teaching than a bishops' conference's campaigning for increased government aid to the unfortunate. The bishops' conference itself would also be better employed than that if it pressed the government to punish those who were able to help the abject poor in dire emergencies as justice demands but who did not give such help, especially if attending properly to justice gave rise, particularly at first, to many being abjectly poor and in dire need of direct emergency assistance. Charity enforced only by religious zeal might seem less reliable as a source of regular support than being able to vote out of office any politician not firmly committed to welfare-statism, but religious zeal is often keener than the kind of political apathy which ultimately neglects justice and it can be keen enough to make both charity and justice reasonably reliable, especially when the final necessity of both is properly preached personally by committed clergy. However, any serious attempt by many Catholics to live by the ideals presented in these essays may well be doomed for some time to fail, except so far as martyrdom would save the souls of any

martyred for that attempt, unless the Consecration of Russia to Mary's Immaculate Heart has already been done as she requested at Fatima or unless the attempt to live by justice and the love of God prompts the Pope and his bishops, as a result of the reaction of worldly powers, to realize that such a Consecration, not yet achieved, ought to be done forthwith. Those who argue that it has been done and requires only the good will of men to be made effective in bringing about peace in the world, ought to be confident that a show of such confidence as would be manifest in many Catholics' thus returning to the roots of their religion must be the only thing that Our Lord and Our Lady now are awaiting to convert Russia and giving us peace for a time.

There are, of course, many who seem to hold that resisting an overwhelming persecution, even to confirm that it is utterly unjust, cannot bear effective witness to the truth and justice of the persecuted cause, but that enduring the persecution without resisting it at all, which is actually appropriate in the case of a punishment justly deserved, must guarantee the eventual success of the cause thus persecuted. Stated thus, it may sound illogical, but it appears frequently employed to excuse failures to resist – which some would call tempting providence by provoking – a persecution before it need become overwhelming. For Christ himself did not

merely “endure martyrdom”: he did not think only of suffering but concentrated strongly, despite his suffering, upon the eternal difference between right and wrong evident to natural reason and also upon his Father’s right to allow wrong so as to render Right even more “interesting,” from which Satan tried to make Christ’s suffering distract him so that he would regret the allowing of evil. The kind of courage which can thus remain aware of good while agony is inflicted can ordinarily be developed only by living a way of life which ordinarily demands at least a little courage nearly every day, even if it is only the courage to refrain from living a way which demands far less of us, or which even demands that we have less courage.

Barring the intervention of Our Lady of Fatima (to be invoked by Pope and Bishops properly consecrating Russia to her Immaculate Heart), the Catholic Church, when it insists on justice in economic activity, must, I think, encounter more or less directly, with consequences more or less direly physical for her members, the teachers of philosophic materialism or, more likely, their disciples, most of whom may be merely their dupes. These will most likely condemn the Church’s insistence on strict justice as promotion of “anti-social individualism.” Some of them will really believe, perhaps and others may act as if they believed,

that all reality is matter and that what seems to be a capacity to grasp spiritual truth, is only the brain's having evolved so as to manipulate other matter for the satisfaction of urges purely physiological. Thus, we find, for example, a literary agent seeking fiction she describes not in terms of presenting patterns of actions for the reader to approve or disapprove but rather in terms of being able to elicit such responses as an accelerated heartbeat or rapid breathing or the formation of teardrops. That is philosophic materialism in practice.

The more we believe we are entirely the products of our society, the nearer we are to becoming so. Those who tell us we are entirely our society's products might well be doing their best, maybe even without their yet believing it, to make us so. For if they are thoroughly consistent regarding their own dogmatic doctrine, they are the kind of people who assume that "society" is the chief purpose, so far, and currently the most effective purveyor of "Evolution." And "Evolution" is "universal movement of matter from simple to complex organization." "Society" therefore must make its members increasingly dependent upon its complexity, so that society itself will grow more and more "self-sufficient" until it has become completely and mechanically so. It means members of the society will play smaller and smaller roles in the "great organization," so that society itself will be

less and less reliant on its own people and on individual initiative. The smaller the part they play in the great arrangement, the more such people will need that part just for their subsistence, though, of course, subsistence will have to be gained by seeking first the kingdom of god and its money.

This seems to be the “direction” in which “society” is “progressing,” unless it is a trap to which people are being led, mostly, perhaps, by Judas goats. For the goal held out to the young by modern education seems to be “learning to become contributing members of society,” and the chief purpose of imprisonment by due process of law seems to be “rehabilitating” criminals so that they contribute to society instead of preying upon it or exploiting its other members by “anti-social” methods. (Exploitation of others by methods not “anti-social” seems perfectly legitimate.) It is necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, for laws to “serve a social purpose” in order to be warranted – regardless, apparently, of any law’s actually serving justice itself: thus, for a law against assisted suicide to be warranted, the kind of suicide prohibited would have to entail the loss to society of a member actually able to contribute to society or reasonably expected to recover from not being able to contribute.

This view of the supremacy of society has not been explicitly proposed publicly by those who most “firmly” hold it, for, as Chesterton suggested, educators dominate the public by proceeding, in their teaching of specifics, upon the basic assumption that their more general views are valid, instead of opening to discussion those general positions or that assumption. We can expect, therefore, that the chief adherents of what we might as well call Societism will only vaguely denounce as “anti-social” anyone who submits that serving society must be only incidental to pursuing justice, which is what really matters, and that society’s survival is not essential to all our ethical formulations. People generally might well become so influenced unconsciously by Societist assumptions that they will welcome or at least accept laws punishing everyone who openly declares that men should do as much as they can for themselves instead of helping “society” do much for all.

The Catholic Church’s endorsing, as eventually I think she must endorse, “social doctrine defying society,” if “society” decides it has been “defied,” might well lead to religious persecution approved on pretexts largely similar to those of ancient Rome itself – barring the intervention of the Fatima Consecration. For Societists would have their kind of society deified; they encourage “competition

of diverse interests” to “decide” what Evolution will finally “ choose,” but, like Capitalists, they want that competition to occur only within their own favourite arena under conditions they favour and which favour them. They will most likely not agree to the kind of fair fight on equal terms on which men who love justice are entitled to insist – an insistence of which the Church should eventually approve formally if a peaceful accommodation can’t be reached, in the same countries, between lovers of justice and people merely servile to society. For that society, to remain at peace, should have to cede to “Justicists” enough territory and natural resources to allow for their living in full conformity with their ideals. The Catholic Church ought to admit of nothing less, and that must put her substantially at odds with business interests throughout most of the world today, since she must define “ownership” by mere moneylenders, the hiring of production for resale, and men’s being required to operate machines powered by fuel from “alienated” sources, as sins against God, who is the fount and origin of the principles of natural justice. She may actually find that the general organization of most modern societies, therefore, really amounts to a “structure of sin,” thereby confirming that in these instances, the moral misery of mankind can

indeed be attributed, very largely at least, to “social structures” which must be replaced if men are to live rightly together.

One sort of peaceful solution to such difficulties might be the formation of bodies of Catholic citizens throughout their country who would petition the national or lower governments to recognize those bodies as political enclaves at the different levels of government, to be assigned exclusive territorial jurisdiction where numbers warrant, having in any case criminal jurisdiction over their own members so far as these dealt only with one another, provided that the levels of government which granted such recognition agreed that punishments meted out in those enclaves sufficed to “deter crime” among reasonable persons tempted to criminal activity. Social attitudes and public policy ought also to make it easy for likeminded people to locate where their numbers would soon warrant their gaining territorial jurisdiction; the law ought not, therefore, to forbid such “religious” discrimination with regard to an owner’s choice of whom to sell his house and land, especially if his land is “productive” property; such laws against “discrimination,” anyway, serve chiefly to reinforce the dependence of individual persons upon their society’s economic “system” and so to diminish their deserving what they need; those laws tend to reduce life itself to an externalized

operation more or less mechanical, as opposed to an activity arising so wholly from within the doer of it that he merits even his own being able to do it.

There should be no objection in Canada, at any rate, to such subordinate political independence founded on principles which opponents could not confute but only reject, since self-government has already been authorized in some parts of the country for native peoples, apparently on the basis of racial descent only. Anyway, bishops ought not to condemn any reasonable manifestations of “anti-social” conduct or civil disobedience aimed at prompting court rulings or enactment of laws which would actually require that economic practices conform to the principles of natural justice. Nor should they reprove as “acting contrary to the Christian spirit of nonviolence” any who may fight fairly and honestly to defend innocent human life against either abortionists or consistent, active opponents of capital punishment for these and other murderers. Rather, they ought to proclaim boldly that no religious teaching of their Church can ever contradict any conclusion properly drawn by logical argument from a self-evident truth – like those discussed in these essays. They ought to insist that Catholic “aggressors” against “members of secular society” should be deemed willing to endure “violence,” rather than seeking eagerly to inflict it, if “society” tries to

punish them because they try to live as men ought. The just ought to let the unjust strike first, even when that means “provoking” them to strike. (The just need not always let the first stroke land.)

Perhaps the first step which Catholic laymen should insist their clergy take, would be abrogation of any requirement by the Church or its bishops that couples seeking Catholic marriage obtain a “marriage licence” from government – or any permission from any secular agency whatever. That requirement amounts to obtaining permission from outside the Church for administration of a sacrament, which ought to be subject solely to the Church’s own authority. If the Church were to administer that sacrament to persons whom the civil authority forbade to engage together in coition, that would be an entirely different matter, but the issuing of “marriage licences,” in Newfoundland at least, is so perfunctory that it does nothing to forestall any such offence. The real purpose of this civil requirement, as of the demand by municipalities that builders obtain “permits,” seems only to accustom citizens to ask for permission from government before they do anything. In any event, the administration of justice usually and normally proceeds by investigating after an offence comes to light and punishing it after the offence is proven by due process.

Laity should also seek to have their clergy cease to act as agents of the state in witnessing and recording marriage vows; clergy by definition are not agents of the state. Let paid officials of the state do the state's own witnessing and recording.

Besides all these things, churches, and especially Catholic parishes, must remain exempt from taxation by any level of government, and that exemption must be based strictly on the recognition that religion is not an exercise in economics: churches do not sell services for profit but subsist on voluntary contributions on which all legitimate taxes were already paid when the money was obtained by means of activity which was actually done for payment. This means, of course, that a tax might be levied on money which a parish raised through bake sales or Bingo.

(VI)

“SEX EDUCATION” AND *EDUCATION*

(A)

CARTESIAN-CAPITALIST ERRORS IN EDUCATION

To guide properly our children’s education we ought perhaps to cleanse our minds entirely of erroneous assumptions already contradicted in these essays but possibly retaining some lingering influence on us until we have reflected upon their origins and on the way exactly that they go wrong. One of these assumptions is that our life is largely a matter of our being managed from above, and another is that it is largely a matter of doing some things in order to have other things done for us. Both of these may be due in part to our having ourselves lived so long under Capitalism, especially Calvinist-influenced Capitalism, and to our having been much affected by the teaching of René Descartes that humans are bodies directed by souls essentially separate from the body and only connected to it at one physical part, so that our bodies, which most of us think of as being ourselves, are “mechanisms of flesh” under the management of higher beings. That error of Descartes exalts human thought over human life, as does the prevailing Capitalist

attitude: both see the human body as meant to serve another and higher creature that controls it, which excuses the inclination of Capitalists to have the more physical sort of purposes purveyed for them and to care little or not at all whether fleshly or other mechanisms are employed for purveying. This may be called a natural outcome of “putting Descartes before the whorish,” when by “whorish” we mean any who specialize in doing for others – as the soul according to Descartes separately specializes in thinking and deciding, like a good Capitalist boss man – one particular function while expecting that whatever they might demand will be available to them as a result. This denies the natural fittingness of a human’s doing things for himself which arises from the soul’s and body’s being united as in one creature.

Our soul is “the part not made of parts, by reason of which our part that is made of parts is alive.” The body has parts and occupies space; not so the soul. If that part of us by which we are self-aware – able to think about ourselves, to reflect that we are thinking thus, to be conscious of our reflecting so, and so on until we get tired or laugh – were made of matter, it could not permit us, who are made partly of matter, thus to “stand beside ourselves” or “look inside ourselves” while remaining the one same self; we might say, perhaps, that that part of us is,

to put it in non-technical terms, “the way that what we are made of is what we are.” All this sort of thing ought to be part of some conversations parents have with their children, which they could broach as an introduction to thinking well that might not be offered in school. Parents trying this might have to counter an assumption that what is not taught in school will not matter; they ought beforehand to have avoided lending weight to any such assumption. They ought never to have replied, “You’ll learn about that in school,” just because they were “busy,” when a child of theirs asked them about something they themselves knew or could readily find out. (Parents should feel keenly the insolence of contemporary educators’ insisting, as these so often do, that parents are an important “part” of their children’s education by government-employed “professionals.”)

Capitalist masters who deem their guiding production to be a higher function than genuine making, because Descartes taught them to see humanity as “naturally” divided between thinking creatures and creatures performing physical functions, might feel confirmed in that impression by the Calvinist doctrine that material prosperity is a mark of some men’s having an infinitely higher destiny than most despite all men’s being so depraved as to merit only hell.

Vestiges of that Calvinist doctrine may also persuade unconsciously some Catholics that our salvation is wholly a matter of God's initiative and energy requiring little in the way of action from us, which could be a very comfortable assumption for the spiritually indolent: we might feel that if he chose to die on a cross to save us for himself, well, that was his choice and it's his business to see that it does us good. Also, that particular Calvinist doctrine would tend to imply that those men are most like God who show the most initiative and energy in getting others to be the kind of underlings they would like: Capitalist boss men are the men most like God. And it would deny that following God's will to see what he sees is a privilege well worth our most extreme effort. In any case, the notion that those of us who are most able to get what they want are in the highest category among us is consistent also with Evolutionist philosophy, as is the notion that the best "teachers" are the ones most able to make young minds absorb what the most influential educationists think they should contain.

The Cartesian doctrine of human nature would also do much to promote that hope which some entertain of "transferring consciousness" to a "superior" mechanism developed by men – "Artificial Intelligence" as "the next step in Evolution." Such a transfer might be feasible perhaps, if Descartes had not been

wrong, and if it were feasible it could vastly increase our ability to calculate but, if Descartes was wrong and especially if all humans have the same kind of soul, it could not possibly alter the nature of our understanding and so would not really be much of an improvement. For it is evident that we gain knowledge by “understanding” with our minds the actual thing “standing under” what is apparent to the senses: the thing not so much “underlying” or “behind” appearances as manifesting itself “by” or “in” them.

What thus “stands under” its appearances we understand as being indivisible, as being the one thing and not two things, so the “concept” representing it in our understanding must in fact be “spiritual” – not made of parts or occupying space. To produce “Artificial Intelligence” genuinely superior to human minds, men would have to put together “mechanical brains” complex enough to attract a far more powerful kind of spirit than the human soul to operate them; the kinds more powerful are the angels and the devils, and these are so powerful that every angel is a different kind of angel and every devil a different kind of devil, as all our souls would be of different kinds if Descartes were right, which would encourage humans who believed him to deem themselves superior kinds of human.

The Cartesian error, especially when combined with the Capitalist error that human life is naturally an exchange of specialized functions, can too easily misdirect our thinking about sex and marriage generally and promote in particular what some call “solitary vice” – which actually is “solitary sin against chastity” at first and will be “vice” only if it becomes habitual as it so easily can. That combination of errors can foster our feeling that “Sex” is strictly the business of the body and so beneath the dignity of the soul and that God gives us sexual pleasure in exchange for our procreating worshippers for him, he being quite content with our aiming at coition, the desire for which, strictly as an isolated incident, must then be a kind of primary motivation akin to the power of first principles; this must almost inevitably give rise to prurient curiosity which may try to satisfy itself through that “purely spiritual contemplation” which is the great business of the soul – and which in this case is very likely to entail an unfortunate bodily concomitant. The notions that sex is unworthy of the spirit, and that religion is more suitable to women than to men, have been known to foster a feeling that coition ought to be distasteful to feminine persons or is at least beneath the dignity of woman, possibly leading to a kind of envy in males who may be jealous of what they deem their own personal worth, so that they may in

secret relish imagine bringing women, whose bodies as opposed to their regard must be unworthy objectives, down to a lower level even as they would scorn being overtly unchivalrous toward womankind in person. (The evident conflict between those attitudes might largely be ignored while both seemed actually to support the same specific fancy.) In particular, young males so imbued with these notions as to be denied the innocent attractiveness of a pleasing privilege to be patiently forgone until marriage, might therefore suppress all external evidence of “shameful” sexual interest and bury that interest prematurely to writhe barren but undetected by authorities presumed keenly watching for it; that might be the case particularly of especially callow prigs who felt that awareness of enjoying an experience is more worthy than enjoyment itself; the priests and monks who’d lectured them sternly about Purity and so perhaps prompted some to desire self-approval would not have stressed Frank Sheed’s lesson that the real “bliss” of coition consists in the couple’s thus sharing their experience of each other’s personalities. A habit of “thoughtfulness” thus formed may eventually require asking God himself to decide whether delivering the tempted or permitting a confirmed sinner to sin again and so realize his soul’s condition, would better serve God’s glory. (It may be pertinent to refer here or hereabout to C.S. Lewis’s

observation that we learn best the nature of our temptations by not giving into them. Highly pertinent.)

“Social studies” classes dealing with the “development of capitalism” must emphasize that Capitalism did not develop so much as it was imposed and that “evolution’s” chief effect on capitalism has been its relatively recent “advance” from using people to exploit the earth to its employing machinery in the exploitation of people; otherwise, capitalism has not much changed since it was practised in Palestine by landlords in the time of Christ. The coercive capitalism prevalent in Dark Ages Europe did in fact truly evolve into a system far more humane – until the Protestant Reformation in England re-inflicted capitalism on the feudal society gradually growing toward something even better and less a system. Social studies dealing with any sort of system, moreover, would do well to point out that the chief attraction of systems is their fitting neatly within the mind – and to refer pointedly in that context to G.K. Chesterton’s remark that some men go mad through trying to fit reality into their minds instead of trying to stretch their minds to fit reality. For some men keep themselves sane, to outward appearance, by compromising to embrace systems such as capitalism: the idea that wealth should be used to gain more wealth and that people not made happy

by doing so are mentally maladjusted – a theory made up rather than a truth discovered – is speciously quite self-contained and will fit well within a mind most narrowly rationalistic.

The chief fault of the feudal system was not that it was, like capitalism, an economic system, but that it was, like capitalism, also a social system; it made purely social relations, even when they were not economic or political relations, fit neatly within the mind of man; only political relations ought really to be at all stiffly systematic, and social relations ought to be subject to the political system only so far as that system forbids and punishes injustice. (Feudalism's being a system in the first place might have facilitated to some degree its being replaced by another system far worse.) Economic relations ought to be subject to social customs instead of dictating such customs as happens under Capitalism. Our chief social custom should be our acknowledging the paramount importance in our society of any woman over all men; it is because Capitalism recognizes nothing of the sort that many women now are seeking the only kind of importance available under Capitalism.

The purpose of any system whatever is to serve, and even to point out the existence of, but certainly not to support, the wider and more primary reality

which is that system's context; at most, the context needs the system only as an expression of the context: the more clearly it expresses the context, the better it is as a system. The context doesn't need a particular system; the system needs the context. Economic "systems" tending to operate independently of a wider context, as Capitalism tends to operate independently of familial needs and functions, are bad systems, just as (Chesterton wrote) fiction which appeases instead of whetting any zest for life itself which we may already feel is bad fiction.

Most things we make up share the attractions of systems. The chief value and attractiveness of the realistic fiction which grew up with capitalism may be its being more or less a "system" of actions fitting in orderly fashion within our thought – though the best kind of fiction will suggest, like Brian Garfield's Western novel *Arizona*, that there is more to be thought about than this particular story we are reading just now. A worthy education would teach the proper function of fiction of all kinds, which is to foster our embracing the difficulties of real life, not our escaping these: most commercial and industrial "jobs" and "enterprises" are fictions fashioned for avoidance of the dangers and diligence which nature and nature's God require of us. If "romance fiction" tends to satisfy even temporarily a longing for love, or the capacity for love, instead of enhancing

a desire to deal dearly with some real person with whom we are indeed acquainted, it does us a great disservice. If it purports, as the novels of John D. MacDonald apparently purport, to teach us how a real person with whom we want to deal dearly must actually think and feel, instead of prompting us to find that out directly from the real person, it probably misleads us especially badly. We are already much misled also by any who assume, both in fiction and in non-fiction writings, that the modern way of life “is reality” or even that it ought to be regarded as a sort of fitting variation upon reality. Much mental illness may be due to men’s being fitted to flourish only in this sort of factitious environment and to their naturally preferring deeper reality without being able to effect an actual acquaintance with its principles.

That our modern jobs and enterprises are indeed a sort of fiction allowing people to avoid a natural and deeper reality, is borne out by the current trend of advertising “career opportunities” as affording the young prospective employee chiefly an activity he will like performing (which his “education” was meant to make him think he will enjoy.) That most of us must work for others or go cold and hungry is a lesson most of us elders were taught early but which is

sufficiently distasteful to young moderns for their learning it to be postponed until the entertainment value with which the media had invested their careers runs out.

There are other ways in which modern fiction, in books or on television, mostly, does us a disservice. It also appeases our desire to behold order, so that we are the less desperate to find right order, or impose it, in our own actual circumstances. And, although it ostensibly condemns being “judgemental,” it fosters being judgemental. For it contemns people who judge certain kinds of action to be wrong, but only by suggesting that these kinds of wrong are not importantly wrong, if at all. But when it presents characters who do what it deems “really wrong,” like theft and murder, it most often presents those characters as doing what is wrong from motives which are obviously “bad,” so that those characters in the end are punished not for having done what is objectively wrong but for “being bad.” And if deciding which persons are the “bad” ones is not being “judgemental,” then what is it? This attitude practically bars us from establishing laws upholding objective standards which we would fight to enforce even against people with the most excellent motives, as earlier essays here have shown we ought to do.

Fiction popular at a certain period tended to reinforce the importance of our gaining others' approval. It did this by presenting characters who adopted unpopular positions because they believed these to be right, and who then won the approval of all others for having done, because it was right, what had been unpopular. It is possible that the attitudes of many now in their sixties were unduly influenced by this sort of fiction, so that they cannot bear the disapproval of others when it turns out to be lasting.

Modern fiction of the sort meant to excite strong fear and then a sense of relief from peril tends to emphasize rather physical peril than moral, and when it presents any danger of doing wrong it sets off that peril almost equally against the danger of suffering death or agony, so that the hero of such fiction is expected equally to avoid both dangers, instead of willingly suffering and dying rather than do wrong. Thus it tends to neglect (at best) wrong's being always worse than harm.

It would be interesting to know, as doubtless we shall know at the Last Judgement, for exactly how many boys the obligation to fight fair has been discounted by the "urgency" of John Wayne's resorting to dynamite to achieve justice in several exciting Western movies where the villains took refuge behind

adobe walls instead of facing the heroic Wayne in the open street. And, of course, science fiction may have done much to promote the assumption, mentioned by Chesterton in *The Illustrated London News*, that because things formerly deemed “contrary to the laws of science” have actually been done, therefore the laws of morality may change also; science fiction sometimes offers “alternative morality” as part of an attractive and “inevitable” future. But the “conclusions of science” – which G.K. said does not conclude in any permanent sense but is always retracting previous “conclusions” – are not themselves self-evidently true as our moral principles are.

Some television series like *Prison Break* or *Breaking Bad* may be deliberately intended, by sympathetically showing “good” men doing great wrong for the sake of their families, to instil an unconscious impression that devotion to the family is harmful to the wider society as a whole and that therefore the “familial system” is itself the source of “social evil.” Of course, the older series *Gunsmoke* was emphatically Carlylean in its adulation of the one truly competent man in the vicinity, and in many Western movies earlier the heroes were rootless males roving from isolated task to isolated task in a “system” maintained by lesser men,

whose wives one episode of *Gunsmoke* particularly singled out as flinty-faced bearers of unmitigated sorrow.

It might be that what really moves most of our Capitalist masters is a strong but strictly “secular” and partly debased appreciation for justice in the natural world and for the prerogative of having offspring whom one teaches directly from one’s own inner resources how to live well. It is possible they encourage Environmentalists and Evolutionists as serving a desire of their own to justify their being only temporarily extant, by providing their descendants with extensive estates cultivated on the “villa system” of Europe’s Dark Ages, but which, thanks to “population control,” would be immune from raids by free barbarians. For Capitalists influenced by Descartes especially, as has been suggested, might so much treasure their gift for devising arrangements which purvey what they want, that they deem it the only worthy means of getting what is worthy and so are disinclined to seek anything not thus attainable, such as the eternal life offered men through the merits of Christ the carpenter. A virtually Cartesian concept of society as but the body of the state and government as its brain and therefore the proper locus of separable and superior influences directing society could encourage Capitalists to foster political centralization subject to their own control.

Capitalist masters engineering education to promote their own prosperity (and preserve it among their own descendants) might well feel that humans who let themselves be steered as if they were vehicles for the thoughts of superior creatures justly deserve nothing better, and there may be something in that. So it is important that anyone whom another tries to teach should have “abstract, objective and eternal standards” for judging any doctrine offered him. I suggest that the principles that things belong to those who make them and that no one is judge in his own case, and their logically necessary implications, afford all of us exactly that kind of standard. Any supporters of what they call by the name “education” ought at least to deal openly and explicitly with any suggestion that there are such standards, and people who believe in these ought to make that suggestion often and emphatically to any who claim to educate. It is most important that pupils understand as soon as they are able why they are taught what and that they will not naturally assume, if the impression is conveyed, as teachers may be taught to convey it, that everyone should do what Teacher wants just because Teacher wants it. Boys, especially, ought to be taught to debate in school, on the basis of self-evident principles, such questions as whether education itself ought to be a free-enterprise profession, and to debate the justice

of various modes of employment which others might offer them later. They could even canvass whether a man who had open to him as legal employment only such work as these essays censure, might confine himself to stealing, especially from persons who profited by injustice, what was utterly necessary to sustain his life and then argue in court that he was justified in doing that. For the Catholic doctrine of “subsidiarity” says that no government ought to be used to do what citizens can do for themselves, and it may be particularly important to emphasize how that applies to stealing. A government’s taxing some citizens to assist others who are unfortunate is simply theft when it is not robbery with violence. That is wrong. It is wrong partly because making it a law that the needy must always be assisted encourages the lazy to let themselves become needy. But it is wrong also because when stealing is actually permissible, as the Catholic Church proclaims it sometimes is, the needy ought to do their own stealing if that is at all possible and ought then to offer their own defence of honest necessity. Our young ought to learn especially perhaps that it can be heroically holy to eschew even apparently necessary employments which are unworthy of mankind, to remain hungry as a result, and to steal just enough to stay alive and then endure what might amount to persecution by a state which punished all thefts except those which it allowed

itself to commit. When stealing is indeed allowable, then the principle that things belong to those who make them can indeed lend truth to someone's saying:

“That's mine! I stole it myself!”

Men ought keenly to feel sincere chagrin at not deserving, when they do not deserve, because they do not produce (or do not when necessary steal for themselves), ordinary goods of life; failing to deserve those goods is a worse misfortune, when not actually a fault, than not having the goods themselves; since deserving things is a matter of justice and having them may be only good fortune.

Capitalism-with-a-Calvinist-attitude virtually asserts that it is only temporal comfort and prosperity that matters, as what all men deserve is simply final damnation, so that if temporal prosperity did not quite entail being arbitrarily elected for eternal joy it would then be, as Hilaire Belloc pointed out, the only kind of enjoyment ever available to us, so that we might as well get it while the getting was good. That Calvinist notion probably prompted the “kindness” of Capitalists who discovered that without endangering their own position they could make rise the tide that “raises all boats” and so enable lesser men to become comfortable enough to elude at least the inevitable anxiety accompanying certainty of condemnation; the question of desert would in such cases be

irrelevant and so might be ignored, as very largely it has been, even by men in government who should know better. One great advantage of developing “Artificial Intelligence” would be having that kind of “mind” available to *calculate* with maximum speed and efficiency exactly how to provide most of the people with most of what they (can be induced to) want.

The “reasoning,” even if it is more or less unconscious, of Calvinist-minded Capitalist politicians in power who wanted to “do right by their citizens,” could practically be expressed in a continuing syllogism: “The state exists to prevent men from remaining in a condition of injustice. But remaining in a condition of injustice is the worst thing that can occur to men. Therefore the state exists to prevent the worst thing that can occur to men, if the state can prevent it. But being unjust is a permanent and ineradicable condition of all men. Therefore the worst thing which could occur to men that the manifestation of God’s will in human agencies can prevent, is the eternal damnation all men deserve. But men who enjoy temporal comfort and prosperity are the ones in whom God manifests his will to spare them the worst thing preventable that can occur to men. Therefore the state ought to make manifest the will of God by ensuring that as many men as

possible enjoy temporal prosperity and comfort as the mark of God's favour to his chosen." How's that for logic?

It might seem that even Chesterton favoured gaining good fortune over deserving it, in his remarking on a Shakespearean character's saying something like, "'tis not in mortals to command success, but we'll do better; we'll deserve it." However, G.K. objected to that attitude only specifically, I seem to remember, regarding success in seeking a woman's love. He said anyone sincerely seeking that will be determined to achieve it even though he break thereby every nerve he has, but he will still be far from assuming he can ever deserve it. Experience, I think, will show that that kind of determination will indeed result sometimes in "nervous breakdown," especially for a man who feels he does deserve a woman's love just because it "should" serve his becoming chaste by way of "natural family planning" and who deems this latter essential to his remaining superior to servile circumstances in which having children would enchain him finally and from which he could while single aspire in theory to escape into subsistence farming – a delusion dissipated at last by the practicality of insistent real desire, since it seems Eric Hoffer was correct in writing that a people raised in service to a system must wait for a whole new generation to reclaim its initiative and its right

sometimes to survive even by stealing from the unjustly rich and defending that right by fair use of force. (It does seem, therefore, that merely imagining “success in love,” if only by way of “considering in solitude a probable prospect,” must be poor preparation indeed for being deeply disappointed of a genuine desire; it might even be that deep disappointment of that sort then will almost certainly send its victim back to such spurious solace at least temporarily.) Consenting at last to have children whom we can teach these things, if our currently earning enough is honestly done, and being willing at least initially to endure persecution we can foresee for not repudiating our sound doctrine, might allow us some share in God’s own efficacy against the adverse, which might well be what those who wish to “evolve beyond the bodily” are really seeking: courage is the real requirement of any who would like to evolve beyond their needing it, which seems to be the ultimate goal of “developing artificial intelligence.” That courage would embrace the “paradox” that suffering is always the lesser evil if it inclines us to do wrong, while the possibility of its seeming worse than wrongdoing can fittingly allow atonement when suffering is offered as punishment. But it is not enough simply to say so, for thinking with the intellect alone that wrongdoing is worse than pain can be a way of declining, perhaps unconsciously, to meditate on

how just how horrible some really horrible physical experiences must be, so that the evil of wrongdoing must be even worse to contemplate. We should not, perhaps, emphasize even the sufferings of Hell without at least mentioning that they consist chiefly in our being eternally identified with our own injustices.

These injustices are the only thing requiring our obedience to any system: the Church's system of forgiveness and a political system purely of punishment, leaving the pursuit of justice itself to purely personal initiative exercised chiefly through and in the family, the kind of initiative with which men ought to respond in gratitude to God for his generosity in creating us whom he doesn't need and giving us wholly sufficient reasons for imitating him, though, as is evident from history, Christians have not always believed exactly that that is what he does. Indeed, the Calvinist doctrine of "natural depravity" suggested, to say the least, that doing the will of God is repugnant to mankind, so that enforced or at least reluctant service is our natural lot, which excuses our being coerced by Capitalists. When we see that God means the doing of his will to be attractive to us and that he wants us to see how and why it ought to be so, we become aware of our inalienable right to repudiate what might have been our parents' assumption that they were and we are obliged to "support ourselves" as Capitalism cannily

constrains. But choosing not to seek the will of God must justify our being unhappy for all eternity, just because so much Goodness has been available for us freely to accept. Our simply choosing doesn't justify our choice, but it does justify our having to face the consequences of it.

(B)

TRUTH IN AND ABOUT SEX EDUCATION

If the previous essays here have told truth, then what we ought most to desire, even if painfully we forgo it in order to help others do it better, is to have children in the service of God and his justice; in comparison with that privilege nothing that one sex might want of the other would really be worth wanting. Wanting less than that from a member of the opposite sex, either from selfishness or in generous tribute, is what ought to, and when indeed selfish almost always does, give rise to the “natural shame associated with sex” which some say modern sex education is trying to eradicate, when its real aim more probably is to keep young people from being ashamed of the selfishness it fosters. For we should indeed “naturally” be ashamed of being selfish and even if we but seek coition unselfishly at first, simply to honour like pagans the self-evident goodness of being alive together and being able together to be glad of one another, rejoicing jointly that a seemliness superb (even if it may be only superficial) fortunately is

found where it might not have existed. That particular kind of goodness, not sufficient though almost seeming so, can point us toward God's own self-sufficient goodness which if not now "self-evident to us" is yet "self-evident in itself," as theologians put it, and will be self-evident to us when circumstances permit. But it is almost plainly wrong to pursue an experience as if it were more worthy than its purpose, even if clearly we still permit that purpose's achievement. The alternative to being strictly selfish in our sexuality or eventually becoming simply "besotted with sex" from having taken it seriously, must be desiring to "generate justice," which is what people do when they beget and conceive in order to teach children of their own what is right and how to do right; that ought to be so strong in us that spouses loving it in us would indeed "love us for ourselves."

This if true is psychologically a soundly practical approach to "escaping" sins against chastity: If something is (even if "only" by comparison with the best thing) not worth wanting, then clearly we ought not to want it or regard it as desirable; thinking of sexual experience as something we ought to want but are obliged to forgo is a self-contradictory first step toward self-abuse or at least self-abusive imagining; that is one thing wrong with teaching the young that God made sexual

pleasure great to induce us, or the “sex drive” strong enough to compel us, to procreate strictly on his account.

Catholic educators especially have significantly slighted subtly the generosity of God by implying, as they used at least to seem perhaps unconsciously to imply, that complete sexual experience is a great pleasure God allows those who humbly accept the “lesser” vocation of only supplying him with priests, monks and nuns who do what really matters to him and who are the really worthy teachers of the young. No one should ever imply that. Marriage is sharing with one other in particular the practice of the will of God; it offers a suitably dense focus for attention to his thought, which is fully embodied in Christ our Lord, whose own personality is God’s Self-Awareness and of whom it might indeed be accurate to suggest, perhaps, that the Father “eternally teaches Him to be God.” For what God does “mainly” is to “communicate his nature” in the personality of the Son. We might describe that nature, perhaps, as Thought Which Is the Same Thing as the Mind Which Thinks It; that might be near enough to “defining” God for a young mind. We might say that God the Father is that Mind, God the Son is that Thought, and the Holy Spirit is Their Considering Each Other. Considering that Thought in that Mind, if we come to see it, will be for us eternal beatitude consisting in

astonished wonder at its Perfect Aptness. No matter how routinely fitting it may seem that we simply produce and generate, the Spirit which animated our doing these will eventually reveal Himself to us, if we persevere in grace, as an unending surprise which during all our lives we ought to be ready for Him to spring upon us at any moment. That suddenly perfect eternal moment is what our souls are seeking when we yearn for we know not what, even when our only seeing another human, however definitely different, seems to occasion the desire, so that persons unfortunately too curious about what sexual experience must be like ought to pray that God will make them more interested in what it would be like to have their awareness flooded wholly with the thinking of Christ. He seen thus, and not anything else we might be doing while we watch Him, such as singing over and over again the same short hymn which begins with “Holy, holy, holy Lord God of hosts,” will be what will really interest us and will suffice to be praised ever more emphatically and profoundly with the same repeated prayer. And as marriage is the mode of human life naturally best suited to our practice of the will of God, so that much of men’s joy in heaven will grow out of and build upon their memories of married life, so married life ought to grow out of and build upon memories of life before marriage, all of which ought to be such as the

spouses will gladly present each other. That is another reason for wanting children to be brought up with an entirely wholesome view of sex-and-marriage and of having children of their own: if they really are to find their sex drive later to be quite overwhelming, they ought at least to deem themselves unfortunate in being thus oppressed as a result of Satan's having brought about the Fall. Also, they ought to be encouraged early to keep their minds occupied with thoughts of making things and of teaching both making and morals, so that sexual temptations, when they arrive, will intrude as distractions instead of being a primary interest from which one must sometimes turn for some other distraction.

It could that people in the Middle Ages were “shameless about sex” precisely because their “theory of sex” was, at least theoretically, thoroughly generous, founded on the principle of gratefully giving back generosity to God. They could be thoroughly chaste not by trying to deny desire but by duly directing it, delightedly and diligently. We are constrained today not to do that, by our staying dependent on corporate commercialism partly because we are not humbly sure enough that we can in almost certain spiritual safety stand or fall economically by our own efforts, with others helping us only to make these. It is so thoroughly fitting for humans to do for themselves something difficult that no one should be

surprised if people no longer striving to remain just are working hard at being healthy rather than seeking a higher goal whose very fashion of our pursuing it would be highly conducive to physical health. Nor need it be much more surprising if psychological studies discovered that much domestic violence seemed to stem from men's resenting a wife in her capacity as a hostage they gave to those with excessively massive fortunes. Also, of course, men who would rather starve to death than not be able to feed themselves, unless others fed them out of disinterested love for the God they all adored, might be more ready than most moderns may appear to view capital punishment from the standpoint of objective and disinterested justice. But perhaps we digress.

A proper upbringing ought to emphasize that simply "being good parents to children" will not suffice unless it entails showing them how to teach their own future offspring to be good parents, chiefly because the Divine Sonship consists in "helping God be Father." People sincerely pursuing that privilege would begin to teach their children early to bend all other habits and functions toward it, so that, for instance, they should eat not just because they feel like it but chiefly because eating is essential, in ordinary circumstances, to being able to continue doing God's will, and enjoying food is a way of celebrating being allowed to do his will,

which medieval people seem to have celebrated well and often; they had much more to celebrate than merely being allowed time off from work, which appears to be what most moderns celebrate more than the actual occasion of any particular “holiday.”

If, however, anyone expects here to be shown clearly the full nobility and beauty of the privilege offered us in generating for justice, he is overrating at least ten-thousandfold the present writer’s powers of poetic portrayal. All that can be attempted here is to suggest that logic points to the conclusion that pursuing this privilege is the only way properly to make sense of being human.

Teaching children to be “good sons of God” entails not so much urging them to “try to be good (like him)” as to do the kind of deeds he does, since by doing them we ought eventually to “become good.” Trying to “be good” can too easily be due to pride, or lead to pride. Being told that we “ought to be good” could lead us to assume that “all the ordinary people” really are good and to believe, when we find out that we are not good people, as no people are, that we are unusually worse than “ordinary” people, which because of our pride makes it difficult to accept the truth about ourselves; loving others as ourselves means wanting everyone to realize that truth about all of us, perhaps as a result of its being stated

in general terms but almost certainly not as a result of our telling other individuals directly that they are not good persons. When spiritual directors tell Catholics we ought to be aware of our virtues, they mean almost certainly not that we ought to see a specific goodness in our own souls but rather that we ought to realize we have a habit of doing specific kinds of deeds which are right or of avoiding specific kinds of wrongdoing. A parent's naively expecting to see always "personal goodness" in her child as a matter of course and her fierce response to finding what is actually there instead, might possibly dispose the child sooner or later to seek even sinful reassurance that he is in at least some fashion "personally" attractive. It might be well to suggest that parents seek only to encourage actions objectively right and punish actions objectively wrong, and let children's self-knowledge grow in its own good time, as maybe it must if the child is not to reject it. In any case, the best kind of knowledge of self that we can acquire might be our knowing in a general sense the kind of self that every human is: a self composed of spirit and matter, which is no longer itself when the soul becomes separated from the body made peculiarly for that particular soul, the body by reason of which a soul becomes one particular soul, so that it is most likely especially foolishly futile to fancy that any of us might in the future transfer

a “conscious self” to a far more subtly corporeal or a non-corporeal level of existence and so become a kind of daimon like perhaps the ancient Chinese dragons or a kind of pagan god. Men who were really “patriotically human” would be content, or even obstinate, to live the Divine Life of Sonship as it now is except, of course, for its being purified of all injustice. That Divine Life is as high as we can go, so that the best thing we can actually do in the way of natural “evolution” might well be our “bringing out” and developing those tendencies of lesser creatures which lend themselves to our own service of justice; we might do that, for instance, by enhancing rather than replacing the qualities we find in the soil or the plant-life of a particular place so as to make that place as worthy of our use or habitation as we could render it without radically altering it.

The memories of life before marriage which husbands and wives present each other ought to be steeped in differences of mentality which a woman finds fascinating in a husband and a man finds fascinating in a wife; if such differences don’t occur “naturally,” they could be cultivated by education, if only to keep marriage from becoming too soon routine. For instance, boys could be taught that men ought primarily to seek justice simply because it is objectively right to do so, because justice is truly justice, and girls could be taught that women are allowed

chiefly to seek justice “because it’s good for people” – partly, perhaps, in keeping people together through their sharing an important interest.

Another difference between masculine and feminine persons which it may well be profitable to cultivate if not already present, would be the difference between leaders and managers, with men being mostly leaders and women being mostly managers, leaders needing to be ruthless in teaching objective standards of truth and conduct and in punishing departures from these and managers requiring a certain sensitivity to maintain unity among free people working for a common purpose. It may be highly appropriate that men be the leaders of the family, since leaders who really lead and are not tyrants must be chosen for their office instead of seizing it themselves; it may be important that the husband be the leader, or “head,” of the family, whether the family is going where he leads or he merely leads where it was going.

Dedication to objective justice ought to be the solid core of every man and woman, with woman especially cherishing all those “trivia” which men tend to overlook but which a man can relish, as “not opposed to justice,” his own wife’s “insanely” insisting upon. Where essential “personness” possesses such a solid core, the nuances of “mere personality” can be properly appreciated and where all

around have the same sound reasons for marriage, a particular couple's simply being in love together can properly be chiefly their own specific motive. Also, we can almost regard it as an axiom of almost mathematical certainty that people equally devoted to the same thing will be devoted to each other. We might almost describe the Christian ideal of unselfish married love, fairly accurately, by saying a man should want to be that part of his wife which begets her children and knows what she should teach them, and a wife should want to be that part of her husband which bears his children and knows how he should teach them; though men ought not to insist so much on the second part of that description as women on the first.

The importance to marriage of our memories of single life may correspond to the importance to his Church of our Lord's present memories of his life as a single man on earth, which merited the graces he is applying to our living now as the Church's children, our living which ought to embrace so far as we can learn of it our forefathers' recalling his deeds and responding to his grace, by living so far as we can as he lived or as the married people lived whom his work as a carpenter assisted. It cannot ever be too early for Catholic parents to start shaping the expectation of what it must mean to live as a child of God who, it might possibly be, wanted humans to be his children so that he could in some sense be grateful,

as he is grateful to his Son, for their freely responding rightly to recognizing fully that his life is infinitely worth sharing; he wanted to make creatures whom their parents and his Son would teach to do as he does, as, possibly, he eternally “teaches” his own Son.

Parents ought, when their children are old enough to be taught any of the practicalities of sex, to stress Frank Sheed’s lesson that the real “bliss” of coition consists in the couple’s sharing thus their experience of each other’s personalities – which means coition is not an aim but a method of the “communication” which woman is said to prize; it ought to “communicate” one’s sense of the other’s worthiness to have children and one’s grateful gladness at being deemed worthy of her and her children, as well as one’s approval of any way in which the other’s merely physical attributes “embody” the moral traits they want their offspring especially to practice. It might be well also to suggest to the nearly grown young, as a possibility of practical psychology, that many males may tend to regard their own main motive for coition as an objective to be attained by “a combined-forces operation,” routinely subordinating personalities to purposes. Males and females of our kind may tend also to approach differently their approving and their being pleased, women tending more to join approval and enjoyment, and men tending

more to allow enjoying particular aspects of things which on other grounds they disapprove, like unchaste women physically attractive. Again, C.S. Lewis's observation that it seems a lustful man thinks of a woman's body and a lustful woman thinks of her own body, might suggest that a man wants mostly to be pleased by a particular "solid reality" and that a woman wishes most to be pleased by her being pleasing to someone who is himself a pleasant person, so that a woman "obviously seeking sex" may be violently repelled emotionally by sensing at any point in the process that her prospective partner is pursuing ungraciously his own greedy gratification, and if she has sensed this too late for prevention, she may well feel "raped." That may have led to the suggestion arising from sympathy with the sensitive thus insulted by gloating gaze of gratified gluttons ungrateful, that rape is not a sexual offence but only a violent and immoderate grasping at "power" (in the abstract) – as if would-be dictators usually execute a coup d'état with their trousers down about their ankles. The truth may be that men who rape physically, rather than by suggestion after the fact, are prompted chiefly by frustration at their failing to exercise over a particular woman the kind of power of attraction which that woman has over them. However that may be, woman ought to have ways less drastic than coition of being pleasing to men she

deems pleasant and of testing thereby whether they are men of whom she ought to approve. Such ways are somewhat scarce these days, thanks to the modern capitalist way of life rendering communal dancing, among other things, “obsolete” and “trivializing sex” – as people perhaps “ought” to trivialize it, in order to be consistent, if they deprecate generation, as some now complaining that sex has been trivialized don’t seem fully to realize.

Now, if we men are indeed properly the first teachers of the truth that being unjust or allowing others to be unjust is worse than only physically dying, men ought primarily to be the ones who die defending that truth when things really come to that. And if woman is primarily the way we transmit and so preserve human recognition of the reality of justice, she is an important aspect of what we ought to die defending and therefore ought to be so defended, not being obliged to defend herself until all her men are dead. (It may be insanely romantic to suggest that a woman might rather die than that her men fail to defend her, but if a woman thoroughly in love may not be insanely romantic, who may?)

Neither woman nor the Church women embody should ever have to resist physical attack, for both womanhood and the Church are institutions of Charity – not charitable institutions as such are commonly understood, but rather they

“institute” Charity almost as Charity has instituted them. While respecting justice entails a fierce willingness to fight fairly for it, Charity ought to make us sorrowful for the souls of those who resist it, as women often are sorrowful for any who are bound in duty to fight. Chesterton said women themselves ordinarily don’t fight, not because they are afraid – they aren’t – of fighting but because fighting, or rather the kind of contact it rightly entails, thoroughly disgusts them. They are wholly right in that, for woman is the source and summit of the most joyful and bountifully beneficial physical contact humans well can manage; she ought not, therefore, to engage in or be subjected to physical contact causing harm, pain or grief, however necessary; the same substance ought not to be both ordinary delightful nourishment and drastic purgative. Women therefore ought not to fight but rather to be the reason others fight (as men may sometimes fight for sustenance as much as for drastic remedy). Their being the reason for others’ fighting is very nearly what happens when women soldiers deliver death with weapons which essentially do their fighting for them, as mechanical weaponry mostly does. Chesterton said also that when women do fight, they don’t fight fair – as no one does in letting his weapons fight for him. It is precisely, perhaps, the prevalence of such weaponry that allows and even encourages modern women to

be soldiers in the service of “democracy,” especially when “democracy” thinks it ought to prevail by fair means or foul and when it only means expressing wishes through the vote and never doing anything more to get what you ought to have.

The fruitfulness of femininity can well be forgetful of pride in lesser privilege. Providing the ordinary humans who may fight for justice, for whom woman then can actually be sorrowful and teach other men to be sorrowful, when these latter must exercise that lesser privilege, is an extraordinary munificence which exempts from fighting on her own account anyone thus gifted or who is of the sex which can be. For women then is as much the author of just performance as she is the author of human fatherhood when she gives in God’s name her own permission to the fatherhood of ordinary men, in the kind of exchange of men’s and woman’s roles which C.S. Lewis said is almost perpetual. Women abuse that right of exchange when they only initiate a process which is maintained by inanimate mechanical weaponry, in the manner of ordinary humans “only initiating” the process of generation, who are obliged, however, to maintain the process of fighting when justice warrants a fight.

Fathering mothers who can with monumental, sincere sorrow surrender sons to justice, and mothering men to love law, woman and country – “as loved our

fathers” – is a most glorious “division of labour” and almost the only one strictly necessary. But it is utterly necessary to mankind’s serving justice with any degree of efficiency: assigning the separate specialties of nurture and defence sometimes to persons of one sex and sometimes to persons of the other, during the same period, must complicate needlessly and restrict the choosing of spouses and so obstruct the duty of mankind to generate more men and women. (When that is clearly seen as a duty more or less impersonal, men and women will be better able to co-operate personally in performing it.) And assigning nurture almost exclusively to women and the fair fight exclusively to men will tend to lend validity to women’s general tendency, when they do fight, Chesterton observed, not to fight fair. For a woman ought to fight only when that is utterly necessary to defend herself or her children, and on that occasion there is no need at all for her to fight fair, for anyone attacking her or them is not himself fighting fair to begin with.

(C)

EVOLUTIONIST ERROR IN SEX EDUCATION

Many allow professional schoolteachers to tell children publicly – that is, in groups of both sexes together – about facts and implications of human sexuality, chiefly perhaps because parents when they actually teach their own children naturally desire that their lessons be worthy both of parenthood and childhood, and the view of sex prevailing in modern educationist circles seems worthy of neither, being far more in accord with Capitalism, as may be seen in a later essay, and (especially) with Evolutionism. But maybe most parents deem it “anti-social” to contradict outright anyone to whom “society” has “assigned” the forming of “its own” young members’ minds. Such “anti-socialism” is much needed, as is anti-Capitalism, since it might well be that modern parents are sorely ill-equipped by their own previous schooling either to show their own children how to live well and rightly or to inculcate the kind of career competence to which capitalists want them constrained and which almost logically requires conforming to those

standards for sexual expression which educationist professionals prefer to profess: the view of sex apparently popular in modern educationist circles seems more worthy of persons dogmatically Evolutionist rather than devoutly Catholic or even loosely Christian: the sexual theory and the dogma seem mutually supportive. The dogma, of course, is that mere matter is always reaching out to complicate itself increasingly, that sex is an important contributor to matter's self-aggrandizement, and that our mind is only an intricate mechanism of acquisition, calculating how to get what we feel like wanting, essentially as a cash register calculates how much change we get from a ten-dollar bill for a doughnut at Tim Horton's; any question of our deserving a certain amount of change is irrelevant; the relevant question is how much change we want and whether we can get it. "Belief" in that dogma may be why children are taught in school mostly to solve problems: to "get" solutions, practicing "how to seek" under conditions preset and presumed, without ever considering whether there are sound reasons as well as subjectively pressing motives for deeming anything worth seeking. Possibly any gift which students may have for sound moral reasoning is thus neglected on the principle of "use it or lose it." This attitude may be the reason some people think that advanced "Artificial Intelligence" must be "the next step in evolution": such

“intelligence” will be “vastly superior to human minds” because it will *calculate* with vastly superior speed and precision; neither it nor anyone else, in order to be superior to anything, will need actually to understand anything; the ability to calculate how best and most quickly the most of us can be supplied with what we most feel like enjoying will supersede any “need” we might think have to explain “why” we “deserve” what we want, since such “rationality” is but an illusion anyway.

Naturally, there is an acceptable alternative to sound morality or rational understanding for those subjects of Evolutionist educational experiment whose self-esteem might suffer from learning they are only clever beasts with a better gift of grab. This other dogma exalts “choice”: the choosing of anything at all not because it could possibly wield any sort of influence over us but just because we choose to choose; any choice we make is a valid act of Evolution assisting matter’s self-aggrandizement, which soon will advance much further when those educated enough “digitize and download consciousness” to better vessels than fleshly bodies or just subsist in (electrical?) digitization. (The “religious” doctrine that wrong is wrong and right is right only because God chooses to have it so might have helped exalt this Evolutionist dogma in many minds; some might feel

they are legitimately imitating God in exercising the same faculty in the same way, and others might resent what they feel is his restricting that “privilege” solely to himself when he might perhaps have let men share in it.

These “Desirist” and “Choosist” dogmas are balderdash and bosh, respectively. But it is important just at present to oppose them actively with appeals to reason, which mostly we must address to people on whom the reality of reason has not lost its hold, whom we ought to teach to raise children who will reason well and enjoy it enough not lightly to relinquish the exercise. One elementary exercise of the sort would be to point out, to any capable of appreciating it, that all a consistent Balderdashian or Boshist can really say for his position is, “I feel like having you believe this,” or “I choose that you choose that,” and that the young subject of Evolutionist educational experiment who is thus addressed might justifiably respond only: “You poor benighted bastard, I’d rather be a toad in a ditch.” For if a thing can do what it does only because it is what it is, we have to be at least partly “spiritual” – that is, we must have a part which is real without itself having parts or taking up space – in order even to conceive of anything of the sort, which obviously we can conceive. That part of us is what we call our “soul.” It’s what we use to weigh evidence and draw conclusions, not something,

as René Descartes taught it was, which does these for us – unless we're much mistaken in thinking we think for ourselves.

Some people counter Evolutionism with the argument called “Intelligent Design.” That argument, however, must be submitted to the authority of intelligence, thus assuming what those who present that argument are trying to establish. It is far more rational to argue from the fact that we ourselves are intelligent; any who try to disprove that, are themselves appealing to their own intelligence and to ours. We must make them see that, if we can. As Chesterton wrote, our being intellectually intuitive is unproved and unprovable. Perhaps the very best we can do in that line is to prove to another that a third person is thus intelligent. But we need not prove that the origin of the material world must have been thus intelligent when it can readily suffice to say that the origin of any such intelligence must itself be intelligent, since nothing can give what it does not have, and that we do see ourselves to be so, no matter how the Evolutionists are persuaded to see themselves. Another way of stating our case is: You cannot deny that “intellectual intuition” exists unless you know what it is, and if you know what it is, you are using it.

We should teach children to think about thinking as soon as they are able, and guide them in thinking rightly about it. One way is to think out loud with them even before they begin thinking; training a child in the way he should go so that when he is grown he will not depart from it doesn't mean always giving specific commands and watching and besetting so that he has no opportunity to disobey, which will probably result in his being amenable to management by all and sundry and in his being a sneaky sinner; it means showing him as much as possible why what ought to be done is what ought to be done; it may mean showing him good reasons for doing what is right, so far as possible, almost before he does anything much at all. It may mean continually offering him consoling and wholly rational and just explanations, reassuringly, long before he can understand the actual words, for not giving him his own way in every instance, even while he is in almost pre-conscious infancy, so that he can become aware in an environment of rational thought. And it cannot ever be too early for Catholic parents to start shaping the expectation of what it must mean to live as a child of God who, it might possibly be, wanted humans to be his children so that he could in some sense be grateful, as he is grateful to his Son, for their freely responding rightly to recognizing fully that his life is infinitely worth sharing; he wanted to make

creatures whom their parents and his Son would teach to do as he does, as, possibly, he eternally “teaches” his own Son.

Parents who know not how to draw such lessons ought to resent that gap’s having been left in their own education and to resolve that their grandchildren at least must not be thus deprived and bamboozled even by “professional educators” in a system of “compulsory education” where in fact only school attendance was compulsory and no one was required by the law to learn anything, which only camouflaged children’s being indoctrinated in assumptions not debated in the legislatures responsible for public education. Compulsory education ought to mean only that a certain level of learning is required by law for the exercise of citizenship.

A child sent to school with others than his kin should expect to learn there how all of them may later help one another do as much as possible for themselves and how people in the past had lived or failed to live thus. He ought, with some guidance from his parents, to see clearly how his teachers are meeting their obligations in that regard and to suspect them when they are not. The teachers ought to explain, and students ought, from time to time, to ask them to explain, how they are fulfilling that function; the students need not always understand

those explanations, perhaps, but they ought to feel confident they would find them fully acceptable if they understood and that they will understand them later. Some younger children might need assistance even in learning to realize relations between realities seen separately, if each lesson or event or object is so vividly present to their minds and (maybe exceptional) memories as to be kept by itself in a mental compartment of its own. (For instance, that kind of person might hear at the Mass of every Feast of the Epiphany for many years that the wise men “gave him gold, frankincense and myrrh” without his thinking once, until late in life, that this particular gold must have come from some particular ore in some particular part of our common earth on which we all live.) Such assistance early might tend to remedy defective “wiring” or chemistry of the brain, of a kind which might develop later into full-blown schizophrenia. That would be one lesser sort of exercise in reasoning which might be important in helping the young refrain from “thinking about sex” after “thinking out what sex is for.”

Secular sex-education will naturally confirm for young males with “raging hormones” males any suggestion from “Christianity” that coition is important in itself as an isolated incident ignoring any context but mutual consent, and it would almost certainly have encourage in each of them the view that he himself, as a

Product of Evolutionist Transmission, is, however much a Church might prefer humility in its members, important enough to enjoy whatever pleasure may be most important; any Christian teachers who allow that sex may be a primary interest therefore concede too much to the Evolutionist doctrine that our seeking what we want will purvey what ought to be achieved. But some (mostly Protestant perhaps) Christian teachers might be inclined to assume even that it is more the purpose of coition to give pleasure than to generate children, since in fact it gives pleasure more surely and more often than it gives one a child. This would chime with the notion that mankind is “evolving” toward more fun for fewer people. It is opposed by the idea that chastity is a virtue, which means it is a habit of doing good, so that if trying to have children is truly virtuous, the married must make a habit of it, and performing an action only once in nine months or even less frequently would not be much of a habit, and that is the real reason wives are fertile on relatively few days of a month.

That many today do seem to find more real delight in merely “having sex” than in “having sex to have children,” is probably due to modern education’s having made sex far more attractive to its pupils than it allows children to be interesting to their parents. That is the answer to Corner Brook *Western Star* columnist Dara

Squires's asking, "Where have all the children gone?" They've gone where things go when they cease to be interesting: when they stop engaging our ability to think and appeal only to our capacity to feel. (Things failing to do the former usually fail eventually to do the latter.) Generating and feeding children for others to train, educate and entertain isn't nearly as interesting as actually trying to train, educate or entertain anyone at all. That is why Ms. Squires asked whether mothers deserve to work full-time outside the home when they would prefer that, and why she evidently deemed that question only rhetorical: mothers especially deserve interesting work, and the work most employers expect of employees they see to be intelligent is generally more interesting than the limited "duties" which "society" now "assigns" to parents.

However, if it is true that things belong to those who make them, most mothers deserve to care for their children far more than they deserve to have permanent, full-time work outside the home, however interesting; they almost all make their children, but relatively few make work outside the home available to themselves. And by generating children they obviously create any responsibility for looking after them which may exist.

It is possible for parents to do interesting work at home for interesting reasons and to teach that kind of work, and presumably also those reasons, to their own children, unless the children choose to learn different interesting work, in which case they may be apprenticed to other parents. That used to be done when self-government was called “royal government,” and modern parents could learn to do it again if what we call democracy were effectively democratic. Of course, some moderns deny that that is possible; they find it easier to tell us that such social betterment is impossible than to convince us it is undesirable; it may be that so far as they are telling the truth, it is because they are doing their best to keep such social betterment from being attempted: what is not even tried is generally so far impossible.

There are propagandists of modernism who talk and write as if “education” could mean only modernist education and anyone not thus educated must be uneducated. That seems to be what they mean when they say that women’s gaining access to education leads to their having fewer children – so few in some countries that the birth rates fail even to keep widespread the noble duty of having even fewer. But if a Third World girl retaining the “primitive” and what one newspaper editor called the “silly” notion that her place is in her own home

raising her own family, is merely uneducated, then her adopting that notion is either simply instinctive or the result of independent thought or else, if she is in fact mistaken, it shows that education can foster error.

Where “education” means equipping us mainly to enjoy a healthy life as “part of something bigger than ourselves,” especially if the very young pupil, younger every year, tends mostly to mind material impressions, as he might in comparing the school building with his family’s house, sharing in the modern school’s sense of institutional achievement is too readily transferable to a merely commercial corporate entity and may foster a feeling that society itself is corporate in the same sense for the same sort of service and ought spontaneously to evolve of itself rather than to grow out of the shared traditions and aspirations of its members helping one another do as much as possible by themselves. That erroneous theory is only too well aligned with capitalist practice, as the next essay ought well to suggest.

Capitalists could also “justify” controlling a society for their own profit by pointing to Evolutionism’s having discovered in nature by the methods of empirical science an inherent strong tendency toward the development of democratic government highly centralized to promote society’s being self-

directed in its further evolution; a keen desire to evolve must almost certainly help the process along. Evolutionists might claim plausibly enough (for them) that this arose recently enough to establish it as an advanced development of evolutionary production, and the existence of social complexity requiring and permitting such direction tends to confirm this, empirical science having established long since that evolutionary progress consists in “movement from the simple to the complex.” Human sexuality would therefore contribute to Evolution insofar as activities arising from it tended to make social and economic relations more and more complicated physically and to increase the power of increasingly centralized government both over the individual citizen and over all of society. Eventually, society’s very ability to thrive might require that parents themselves teach Evolutionism, and Evolutionist sexism, to their children. Evolutionists might even manage the passing of laws requiring this, if future parents themselves turned out to have been so educated as to know of nothing more interesting or more vital or more rational to teach their children, because the Evolutionists already know full well that it is the lessons we learn from our parents which really stick. That is why today’s parents were taught to teach their children to go to school and absorb what the influential in educationist circles think children’s minds ought to have in them.

Evolutionism could become official social dogma daring us to incur legal rehabilitation for trying to refute it if we failed in time to reject openly the doctrine itself and its implications: If allowing a few to achieve supreme centralized power over both citizens and society is most easily rationalized by preaching Evolutionism, we can expect it to be preached as insidiously as practicable at first and to be embraced most openly after the ruthlessly ambitious few have gained full power. These could claim that all adults who were citizens had at least implicitly accepted Evolutionism by gradually surrendering to the state all the free exercises of authority (“makership”) which most men had earlier assumed to be naturally their own. The state which had thus “evolved autonomously” would have then the right to maintain its own existence by any means necessary, including its relinquishing, with much regret, any components irretrievably “incompatible with social and political wellbeing.” The relinquishment would probably have to be highly painful for the relinquished also, to forestall merely frivolous forsaking of the faithfulness the state would be obliged to demand, so that a citizen could not withhold allegiance or even transfer it except to another state able and willing to defend his choice for him.

People who, Evolutionist or not, would like to see our whole society subject to the government it established, now might argue from our owing life to parenthood that our parents, by giving us life under current political conditions and by not declaring they did so under protest, have made us irrevocably subject to our increasingly Statist society. We might reply that it is not our parents themselves who said that to us, as they ought to have done if that was what they meant, and that if the state had indeed such authority over them it should have obliged them to teach us thus if it had wanted; we are not obliged to accept in default every lesson our mother and father did not teach. In any case, if the state does use every means possible to assert supreme control over citizens, instead of simply claiming the authority needed to punish injustice, that state must stand or fall by the extent of its success in suppressing the human soul.